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CHECK TO THE HEAD: THE TRAGIC DEATH OF NHL
ENFORCER, DEREK BOOGAARD, AND THE NHL’S
NEGLIGENCE –HOW ENFORCERS ARE TREATED
AS SECOND-CLASS EMPLOYEES
“To distill this to one sentence, you take a young man, you sub-
ject him to trauma, you give him pills for that trauma, he be-
comes addicted to those pills, you promise to treat him
for that addiction, and you fail.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
The popularity of professional ice hockey may not rise to the
levels of other professional sports in the United States, because of
the predominance of on-the-ice fighting.2  Interestingly, however,
Gary Bettman, the commissioner of the National Hockey League
(“NHL”), is the only commissioner in major American professional
1. John Branch, In Suit Over Death, Boogaard’s Family Blames the N.H.L., N.Y.
TIMES, May 12, 2013, at D1, [hereinafter “Branch I”], available at http://www.ny-
times.com/2013/05/13/sports/hockey/derek-boogaards-family-sues-nhl-for-
wrongful-death.html (quoting William Gibbs, attorney for Boogaard’s family in suit
against National Hockey League (NHL)).
2. See Jeff Z. Klein & Stu Hackel, A Blow to the NHL’s Positive Buzz, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/26/sports/hockey/a-brawl-is-
a-blow-to-the-nhls-positive-buzz-outdoors.html?_r=0 (discussing why fighting may
be tainting positive buzz of NHL).  Klein and Hackel discuss a game-opening brawl
which broke out on January 18, 2014 between the Calgary Flames and the Vancou-
ver Canucks and note National Football League (NFL) player Richard Sherman’s
following comment about the brawl: “There was a hockey game where they didn’t
even play hockey.  I saw that and I was like, ‘Oh, man, and I’m the thug?’” See id.
Richard Sherman’s comment highlights the hard-hitting, concussion riddled simi-
larity between the professional hockey in the NHL and professional American foot-
ball in the NFL, especially in light of the NFL’s recent influx of unprecedented
concussion litigation—the NFL is dealing with approximately 4,336 cases of for-
mer NFL players that sustained head injuries while playing for NFL teams—which
will likely have a substantial impact on the future physical nature of American
Football. . See Nathan Fenno, Fenno: Derek Boogaard Lawsuit Puts NHL on Notice,
WASHINGTON TIMES (May 13, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2013/may/13/derek-boogaard-lawsuit-puts-nhl-notice/#.UuL5-FGV3yY (discussing
parallels between NFL concussion litigation and NHL’s soon-to-be head injury liti-
gation).  For hockey and the NHL, at least one commentator has speculated that
the case of Derek Boogaard could be “the league’s NFL moment . . . which is not a
positive thing.” See id.  Discussing the issue of concussions in the NHL, Fenno
quotes Paul Anderson, a Kansas City attorney that tracks concussion lawsuits, as
stating the following: “Boogaard’s lawsuit could be a potential game-changer . . . .
It could have far-reaching implications not only to Boogaard’s case in particular,
but to all NHL players generally.  I think this could be the first step toward the
next wave of the NHL concussion litigation.” See id.
(271)
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sports to admit to fighting as part of the sport.3  The most apparent
sign of violence in the NHL is teams’ reliance on enforcers—play-
ers purposefully placed on teams for their physicality and fighting
ability in order to protect their teammates.4  In 2011, the death of
three NHL enforcers, Derek Boogaard, Rick Rypien, and Wade Be-
lak, illuminated the issue of whether to accept fighting as a part of
professional hockey.5
Perhaps the most infamous of the three deaths is that of en-
forcer Derek Boogaard, a 28-year old NHL player who died in May
3. See Patrick K. Thornton, Rewriting Hockey’s Unwritten Rules: Moore v. Ber-
tuzzi, 61 ME. L. REV. 205, 216 (2009) (citing Bettman Worried About Player Safety and
Injury, ESPN NHL (Mar. 26, 2007), http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/news/
story?id=2813743) (stating that hockey is only major sport where sport’s commis-
sioner has condoned fighting as part of its game and discussing suit against NHL
player for incident of on-ice fighting).  Gary Bettman, the NHL commissioner,
stated to the Canadian press that, “[He’s] always taken the view that [fighting] is a
part of the game based on what the game dictates.  [His] view on fighting hasn’t
changed. [The NHL has] never taken active steps or considered eliminating fight-
ing from the game.” Bettman Worried, supra (discussing Bettman’s view that al-
though fight is part of hockey safety remains an ongoing concern). But see Sean
Gentille, NHL Enforcers Are Disappearing, and It Doesn’t Have to Be Easy, SPORT-
INGNEWS (Sep. 18, 2013), http://www.sportingnews.com/nhl/story/2013-09-18/
nhl-fight-rules-new-helmets-visor-regulations-best-fighters-steve-macintyre (arguing
that “mandatory visors for all players entering the league, plus the helmet rule—is
a clear attempt by the league to cut back on fighting without banning it out-
right[ ]”); Stephen Whyno, NHL: Eliminating Fighting Wouldn’t Make Game Safer,
Players Say, THESTAR.COM (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.thestar.com/sports/hockey/
2013/11/06/nhl_eliminating_fighting_wouldnt_make_game_safer_players_say
.html (discussing arguments and evidence for and against banning fighting in
NHL).
4. See Matthew P. Barry, Richard L. Fox & Clark Jones, Judicial Opinion on the
Criminality of Sports Violence in the United States, 15 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1,
7, 8-14 (2005) (identifying hockey’s enforcer role as an example of encouraging
violence in sports); Jeff Yates & William Gillespie, The Problem of Sports Violence and
the Criminal Prosecution Solution, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 145, 150 (stating
“some [NHL] players—called ‘enforcers’—are kept on teams primarily for their
fighting ability and to intimidate opponents” (citing Don Eugene-Nolan Gibson,
Violence in Professional Sports: A Proposal for Self-Regulation, 3 COMM/ENT L.J. 425, 430
(1980))).  Commentators Barry, Fox, and Jones also discuss the issue of whether
violence in sports should be penalized under criminal law. See Barry, Fox & Jones,
supra this note, at 8-14 (citing Debra Feldman, Pandora’s Box is Open: Criminal Prose-
cution Implement, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 310, 313-14 (2003)).
5. See Adrian Dater, Spotlight on the Role of Enforcers in the NHL, THE DENVER
POST (Dec. 1, 2013, 12:01 AM) [hereinafter Dater I], http://www.denverpost
.com/avalanche/ci_24630566/spotlight-role-enforcers-nhl (discussing deaths of
former NHL enforcers). Rick Rypien, who played for the Vancouver Canucks, died
at the age of 27. See id.  “[Rypien] suffered from clinical depression and took
leaves of absence from the team to treat it.  He took his own life in his Alberta
home.” Id.  Wade Belak, who played for the Colorado Avalanche, died at the age
of 35. See id.  “Belak suffered from depression.  His body was found in a Toronto
apartment.  No official cause of death was given by police, but his death was
treated as a suicide.” Id.  For a more detailed discussion of Boogaard’s death, see
infra notes 34-49 and accompanying text. R
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2011 from an accidental drug overdose from using alcohol with
prescribed oxycodone.6  Throughout his NHL career, Boogaard
played in a total of 277 games, participated in at least sixty-six on-
ice-fights, sat in the penalty box for a total of 589 penalty minutes,
and only scored three goals.7  His frequent involvement in on-ice
fighting caused him to incur severe head injuries, and, as a result,
Boogaard suffered from chronic traumatic encephalopathy
(“CTE”), which physicians discovered through a post-mortem brain
6. See Family of Late NHL Player Sues League Over Drug Problem Nelson v. NHL,
25 No. 5 WESTLAW JOURNAL ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 1 (June 12, 2013) (describ-
ing Boogaard’s suit against NHL).  The Associated Press reported that William
Gibbs, one of the attorneys representing Boogaard’s family, as stating the follow-
ing: “The NHL drafted Derek Boogaard because it wanted his massive body to
fight in order to enhance ratings, earnings, and exposure.” See Andrew M. Harris,
Dead Ranger Boogaard’s Estate Sues NHL for Wrongful Death, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS
(May 13, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-05-13/nhl-ac-
cused-in-suit-of-giving-boogaard-drugs-that-led-to-death (discussing filing of suit
against NHL).  See also Complaint at Law at 1, Nelson v. Nat’l Hockey League, 20 F.
Supp. 3d. 650 (Ill. Dist. Ct. 2014) (No. 13 C 4846), 2013 WL 1951586 [hereinafter
“Complaint”]  (listing all of Boogaard family’s claims against NHL).  See also John
Branch, Derek Boogaard: A Brain ‘Going Bad’, N.Y. TIMES Dec. 6, 2011, at B13, [here-
inafter Branch II], similar version available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/
06/sports/hockey/derek-boogaard-a-brain-going-bad.html?pagewanted=5&emc=
etal (mentioning that Hennepin County medical examiner ruled Boogaard’s
death as “an accidental overdose of alcohol and oxycodone”).  In an article for the
New York Times covering Boogaard’s case, journalist Jeff Z. Klein noted that “Boo-
gaard’s parents authorized researcher to examine his Brain after his death, and
those researchers concluded he had a degenerative brain disease linked to re-
peated trauma[;]” and highlighted notable deaths of NHL “enforcers” such as for-
mer Detroit Red Wings “well-known fighter” Bob Probert, who “died of heart
failure in 2010 at age 45[,]” and who, like Boogaard, “was also found to have evi-
dence of degenerative disease, chronic traumatic encephalopathy. [hereinafter
“CTE”].”  Jeff Z. Klein, Boogaard Lawsuit May Shake Up Hockey, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/27/sports/hockey/result-of-boogaard-
suit-against-nhl-union-could-exceed-outline.html (discussing how Boogaard’s law-
suit may have impact on NHL in future).  Boogaard played a total of six seasons in
the NHL: five regular seasons (2005-2010) with the Minnesota Wild (“Wild”), and
one regular season with the New York Rangers (“Rangers”). See Derek Boogaard,
NHL.COM NETWORK, (last visited March 6, 2014) (listing statistics of Boogaard’s
performance on Wild and Rangers).
7. See generally Complaint, supra note 6 (listing all of Boogaard family’s claims R
against NHL). See also Boogaard Family Sues NHL for Son’s Death, CBS CHICAGO (May
13, 2013), http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2013/05/13/report-boogaard-family-sues-
nhl-for-sons-death/ (mentioning Boogaard’s lawsuit and details of his NHL ca-
reer). See also Travis Hughes, Enforcer Role, Not Fighting Itself, The Real Problem in
Hockey, http://www.sbnation.com/nhl/2011/12/12/2630130//hockey-fights-nhl-
enforcers-goons (Dec. 12, 2011, 12:25 EST) (indicating that Boogaard’s total fight
count during his lifetime is unknown because he could have engaged in more
fights as junior level and minor league player).  For details regarding Boogaard’s
goals, see NHL.COM NETWORK, supra note 6.  For a detailed list of Boogaard’s fights R
during his career, see the following web address: http://www.hockeyfights.com/
player/1571 (last visited Sep. 13, 2014).
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autopsy.8  To treat Boogaard’s injuries, NHL team physicians had
prescribed Boogaard a total of 1,021 pills during his 2008-09 season
with the Minnesota Wild, and 366 pills during his 2010-11 season
with the New York Rangers.9  Allegedly, these prescriptions led to
Boogaard’s opioid addiction and eventual death.10
Boogaard’s estate filed a wrongful-death suit against the NHL
and NHL Players’ Association (“NHLPA”), claiming that the NHL
and NHLPA failed to adequately prevent and treat Boogaard’s ad-
diction and abuse of opioids.11  Specifically, the complaint alleged
that the NHL negligently administered the league’s Substance
Abuse Behavioral Program (“SABH”), where Boogaard went for
opioid addiction treatment before his death.12  Moreover, the suit
8. See Complaint, supra note 6, at 2 (mentioning that Boogaard underwent R
two surgeries performed within week of each other at end of 2008-09 season).  For
a complete count of Boogaard’s NHL injuries, see Complaint, supra note 6, paras. R
55-58, 72. For a discussion of Boogaard’s CTE diagnosis, see Complaint, supra note
6, paras. 26-27.  For a discussion of CTE, see infra notes 50-53 and accompanying R
text.
9. See Complaint, supra note 6, paras. 83, 96 (mentioning total number of pills R
prescribed by team physicians to address Boogaard’s injuries). For a complete list
of the types and dosage of painkillers that physicians prescribed for Boogaard, see
Complaint, supra note 6, at 9-12, 15, 20, 27-28, 30. R
10. For a discussion of Boogaard’s opioid addiction, see infra notes 36-49 and R
accompanying text.
11. See generally Complaint, supra note 6, paras.  (outlining Boogaard’s family R
wrongful death suit against the NHL).  For a more complete discussion of all eight
counts against the NHL/NHLPA, see infra note 12 and accompanying text.  For a R
discussion concerning how Boogaard’s case sparked a discussion of the problem
with doctors prescribing alarming amounts of addictive opioids, see Maura Lerner
& Mike Kaszuba, Derek Boogaard’s Death Shows How Easily Patients Can Get Addictive
Pain Pills, STAR TRIBUNE (June 17, 2013), http://www.startribune.com/local/
211700061.html.
12. See generally Complaint, supra note 6.  The suit alleged a total of eight R
counts against the NHL/NHLPA. See id.  The first count alleged that “[a]s a proxi-
mate result of . . . [the NHL’s] negligent acts or omissions, Derek Boogaard suf-
fered personal and pecuniary injuries in the form of addiction, which caused
conscious pain and suffering and a loss of normal life.” See id. at para. 70, at 13.
The second count alleged the following:
The NHL breached its duty to Derek Boogaard to keep him reasonably
safe during his NHL career and to refrain from causing an addiction to
controlled substances . . . .  [and] [a]s a proximate result of . . . acts and
omissions by the NHL, D[erek] B[oogaard] died from an accidental pre-
scription drug overdose on May 13, 2011.
See id. paras. 97, 99, at 19. See also id. para. 98 (alleging eight acts or omissions by
NHL that constituted breaches of NHL’s duty to Boogaard).  The third count
claimed that “[t]he NHL, individually, and by an through its agents in the SABH
Program, breached its duty to D[erek] B[oogaard]” through certain acts and omis-
sions and that these “acts and omissions caused, or contributed to cause, D[erek]
B[oogaard]’s death as a result of accidental drug overdose on May 13, 2011.” See
id. paras. 147, 148, at 28. See also id. para. 147 (alleging eight acts or omissions by
NHL and its agents).  The fourth count claimed the NHL breached, through its
agents, “its assumed duty to curb, cure, and monitor Boogaard’s drug addiction
4
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alleged that the NHLPA’s 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement
(“CBA”) “does not address the NHL’s duties or responsibilities to
keep its [e]nforcers[ ] safe . . . .  does not address procedures for
administering controlled substances to its players[;]” and “does not
address NHL’s duties . . . monitor [players’] general health.13
Players’ suits, similar to Boogaard’s, alleging team physician
medical malpractice and negligence are barred because of federal
preemption, physician tort liability immunity, and state worker
causing pain and suffering and loss of a normal life.”  The fifth count claimed the
NHL was negligent “in monitoring Boogaard for brain trauma during Boogaard’s
NHL playing career caus[ing] CTE and pain and suffering and loss of a normal
life.”  The sixth count claimed the “NHL’s negligence in monitoring Boogaard for
brain trauma during Boogaard’s NHL playing career caused CTE and wrongful
death.”  The seventh count claimed the “NHL’s negligence in using toradol during
Boogaard’s career caused CTE and pain and suffering and the loss of a normal
life.”  The eighth count claimed the “NHL’s negligence in using toradol during
Boogaard’s career caused CTE and wrongful death.” Id. paras. 4, 8, 13, 18, 23, 25,
27, 29.  For information regarding toradol and its side effects, see MEDICINENET
.COM, http://www.drugs.com/toradol.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2014) (discussing
toradol as anti-inflammatory drug used to treat moderate to severe pain).  For
more information on the NHLPA, see NHLPA, Inside NHLPA, NATIONAL HOCKEY
LEAGUE PLAYERS’ ASS’N, http://www.nhlpa.com/inside-nhlpa (last visited Jan. 12,
2015) [hereinafter “NHLPA”] (providing general information about purpose of
NHLPA).  The website states the following: “[T]he NHLPA is the union for profes-
sional hockey players in the National Hockey League (NHL).  Created in 1967, the
union negotiates and enforces fair terms and conditions of employment for NHL
players.” See id.  The complaint alleged that Boogaard’s tort claims arose under
Illinois law, but under 29 U.S.C. Section 1441 (1980), the NHL removed the case
asserting that federal jurisdiction is present under 28 U.S.C. §1331 (1980). See
generally Nelson v. National Hockey League, 2014 WL 656793, at *1 (N.D. Ill.  Feb.
2, 2014) (holding Boogaard’s tort claims were preempted under federal law).
Boogaard’s response was to remand the case to state court by arguing that claims
were not completely preempted by Section 301 of LMRA. See id.
13. See Complaint, supra note 6, paras. 30, 32-33, at 5 (addressing claims R
against NHL/NHLPA for content in CBA).  For purposes of this Comment, the
NHL’s 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement will be distinguished from the
NHL’s 2012 Collective Bargaining Agreement. See generally COLLECTIVE BARGAIN-
ING AGREEMENT BETWEEN NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE AND NATIONAL HOCKEY
LEAGUE PLAYERS’ ASSOCIATION, NHL (Jul. 22, 2005) [hereinafter “2005 CBA”],
available at http://www.nhl.com/cba/2005-CBA.pdf; see also COLLECTIVE BARGAIN-
ING AGREEMENT BETWEEN NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE AND NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE
PLAYERS’ ASSOCIATION (Feb. 15, 2013) [hereinafter “2012 CBA”], available at http:/
/www.nhl.com/nhl/en/v3/ext/CBA2012/NHL_NHLPA_2013_CBA.pdf.  If CBA
is mentioned without the year, it means that both the 2005 CBA and 2012 CBA are
identical on the particular issue.  “Collective bargaining agreements” in other con-
texts to discuss those types of agreements generally apart from a specific NHL
CBA.  Because Boogaard died in May 2011, suit was subject to the 2005 CBA, which
expired in Sept. 15, 2011. See generally Complaint, supra note 6 (filing complaint
and trial pleading on May 10, 2013); 2005 CBA, NHL (Jul. 22, 2005), available at
http://www.nhl.com/cba/2005-CBA.pdf; 2012 CBA, NHL (Feb. 15, 2013), availa-
ble at http://www.nhl.com/nhl/en/v3/ext/CBA2012/NHL_NHLPA_2013_CBA
.pdf.  In discussing Boogaard’s suit, “Boogaard” designates Boogaard’s estate and
family filing suit.
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compensation laws that exempt recovery from “co-employees.”14
These barriers create an atmosphere where professional hockey
team physicians may fail to provide appropriate medical care with-
out fear of serious repercussions.15  Considering professional
hockey’s inherent violence and the recent deaths of three enforcers
in 2011, the NHL and NHLPA should include safeguards in the
CBA to protect the health of NHL players.16  Furthermore, players
that have tort claims against their treating physicians should have a
remedy under workers’ compensation laws.17
Part II lays the foundation of the role of enforcers in the NHL
and the particulars of Boogaard’s case.18  Part III provides the legal
and medical standards required of team physicians, and analyzes
whether Boogaard’s physicians met those standards.19  Part IV ana-
lyzes possible remedies available and concludes that those remedies
are inadequate.20  Part V analyzes Boogaard’s case and argues that
the NHL should medically treat its players in the future.21
14. See Mitten, infra note 83, at 214 (discussing co-employee doctrine). For a
discussion of the inadequacy of remedies available to professional athletes, see in-
fra notes 134-167 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of federal preemption, R
see Nelson, 20 F. Supp. 3d. 650 (Ill. Dist. Ct. Feb. 20, 2014), supra note 12, and R
accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the inadequacy of remedies available to professional
athletes, see infra notes 134-167 and accompanying text. R
16. See Dater I, supra note 5 (mentioning deaths of three NHL enforcers in R
2011). See also Klein & Hackel, supra note 2 (discussing whether violence in hockey R
is tainting its image); see also Allan Muir, Horrifying Injury to George Parros Won’t Affect
the Fighting Debate, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 2, 2013, available at http://nhl.si
.com/2013/10/02/horrifying-injury-to-george-parros-wont-affect-the-fighting-de-
bate/ (discussing brawl between Montreal enforcer, George Parros, and Toronto
“tough guy” Colton Orr).  For a list of current injuries in the NHL, not all of which
resulted from fighting, see NHL Injuries, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/nhl/injuries
(last visited March 6, 2014).
17. For a discussion of why players should have tort claims against their treat-
ing physicians, see infra notes 168-175 and accompanying text. R
18. For a discussion of general information regarding the role of enforcers
and violence in the NHL and in Boogaard’s case, see infra notes 22-81 and accom- R
panying text.
19. For a discussion regarding physician’s duty and standard of care and Boo-
gaard’s negligence claim, see infra notes 82-133 and accompanying text. R
20. For a discussion regarding of the potential yet inadequate remedies availa-
ble for Boogaard, see infra notes 134-192 and accompanying text. R
21. For a discussion of how remedies available to NHL players are applicable
and the implications of the inadequate remedies, see infra notes 168-203 and ac- R
companying text.
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II. BACKGROUND: BOOGAARD’S CASE AGAINST THE NHL AND
WHAT THE NHL SHOULD HAVE KNOWN
A. The Violent Culture of the NHL and the Role of Enforcers
Unsurprisingly, hockey is known as “the most violent of all
team sports[.]”22  Professional hockey stands at the forefront of the
ongoing debate of violence in professional sports because the NHL
remains the “only major league in which violence is, if not quite
institutionalized, nevertheless, actively encouraged.”23  Fighting
and foul play seem to be encouraged because penalties for doing so
do not have a strong deterrent effect.24  The NHL may sustain vio-
22. See Jeff Yates & William Gilespie, supra note 4, at 150, 152-60 (describing R
hockey as having reputation as most violent team sport and discussing potential
criminal prosecution applied to athlete’s conduct).  Yates and Gilespie note that
“[f]ormer [NHL] president Clarence Campbell “has openly admitted that players
are under pressure to fight.” See id. at 150 (footnote omitted) (citing William
Hechter, The Criminal Law and Violence in Sports, 19 CRIM. L.Q. 425, at 428 (1976-
77)).  Further, Yates and Gilespie highlight the following comment of sports attor-
ney and agent Bob Woolf about fighting in hockey:
The premium the NHL puts on fighting was reestablished every time I
talked to a team on behalf of a draft choice.  Invariably, the interview
would get around to how well my client could fight . . . . To my endless
amazement, the clubs—if they got the impression that the boy wasn’t
tough enough—frequently offered to enroll him in boxing classes.
Id. at 150 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (citing BOB WOOLF, BEHIND
CLOSED DOORS, 146-47 (1976)).
23. See J.C.H. Jones & Kenneth G. Stewart, Hit Somebody: Hockey Violence, Eco-
nomics, the Law, and the Twist and McSorley Decisions, 12 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 165,
at 167 (2002) (citations omitted) (discussing inherent violent nature built into
professional hockey); Ken Campbell, NHL’s Violent Culture Encourages Reckless Play,
THE HOCKEY NEWS (Mar. 4, 2013, 14:05 EST), http://www.thehockeynews.com/
articles/50376-NHLs-violent-culture-encourages-reckless-play.html (discussing im-
plications of cheap shots in hockey).  Campbell, the senior writer for The Hockey
News, discusses how enforcers dolling out hard hits in hockey have a “prominent
place” in the NHL and advances that “the NHL is enveloped in such a culture of
violence that it actually encourages [hard hitting] players [such as enforcers] . . .
to exist.” See id.  For a discussion of the history of violence in the NHL, see Jeff Z.
Klein, Hockey’s History, Woven with Violence, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2011), http://www
.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/sports/hockey/hockeys-history-woven-with-violence
.html?pagewanted=all (reporting Adam Gopnik’s, a writer for The New Yorker,
theory that “violence [in hockey started] as an outgrowth of organized hockey’s
origins in late-19th-century Montreal, where ethnic groups formed rival clubs that
gave the game the ‘archaic tang,’  . . . ‘of my gang here versus your gang there.’”).
For a further discussion of why violence is prevalent in the NHL, see generally
John Branch, Derek Boogaard: A Boy Learns to Brawl, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2011, at SP1
[hereinafter “Branch III”] (noting “[e]fforts to ban fighting in the N.H.L. have
long been stymied, in part by the popularity and tradition of it in the junior and
minor leagues”).  Branch mentions that Boogaard grew up with the violence
mentality for hockey when he “stepped into this culture” at sixteen years of age.
See id.
24. See NHL Safer With Fighting, Players Say, CBC SPORTS-THE CANADIAN PRESS
(Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.cbc.ca/sports/hockey/nhl/nhl-safer-with-fighting-
players-say-1.2416907 (arguing whether fighting should be eliminated or whether
7
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lence because of its commercial value.25  Additionally, violence is a
part of the NHL’s history within the nature of the game.26  The
NHL rules penalize “aggressor” players that commit one-sided acts
of fighting not in compliance with the league rules.27  However, on-
safety regulations should just be heightened).  The Canadian Press highlights that
in leagues outside of the United States, namely “European leagues and tourna-
ments regulated by the International Ice Hockey Federation, like the Olympics,
fighting is punishable by ejection along with imposing a five-minute major pen-
alty.” See id.  Further, The Canadian Press notes that “the NHL has taken  steps” to
improve players’ safety such as instituting “[t]he instigator rule . . . to punish play-
ers who clearly initiate fights, [and] leaving the bench to join an altercation carries
an automatic 10-game suspension and so-called ‘staged’ fights are becoming less
popular.” See id. See also NHL OFFICIAL RULES 2014-2015, Rule 46.14, NHL (2014-
2015) [hereinafter “NHL OFFICIAL RULES”] available at http://www.nhl.com/ice/
page.htm?id=26336  (“A major penalty shall be imposed on any player who
fights.”).  “For the first major penalty in any one game, the offender . . . shall be
ruled off the ice for five minutes[.]” See id. § 4, Rule 20.1.  For physical penalties
generally see id. § 6, Rule 46.
25. See Three Reasons Why Hockey Fights Are Allowed, HOCKEY ROUNDTABLE (May
6, 2013), http://hockeyroundtable.com/three-reasons-why-hockey-fights-are-al-
lowed/  (discussing why hockey fights provide entertainment value). See also Adam
Gopnik, Hockey Without Rules, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.newy-
orker.com/online/blogs/sportingscene/2012/04/hockey-violence-blackhawks
.html (noting that violence in hockey has entertainment value); Patrick Hruby,
Jake Simpson & Hampton Stevens, As Hockey Gets More Violent, More People Are
Watching: Coincidence?, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 20, 2012, 9:05 A.M.), http://www
.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2012/04/as-hockey-gets-more-violent-
more-people-are-watching-coincidence/256130/ (noting that hockey fans as well
as players generally like violence and fighting); Greg Wyshynski, Once Again, NHL
Players Voice Overwhelming Opposition to Fighting Ban, YAHOO! SPORTS (Feb. 20, 2012,
12:55 PM), http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/nhl-puck-daddy/once-again-nhl-play-
ers-voice-overwhelming-opposition-fighting-175557533.html (noting that “98 per-
cent of 318 players surveyed in the NHLPA/CBC poll[ ]” were against banning
fighting); Branch II, supra note 6, at B13 (discussing NHL’s reluctance to ban on-
ice fighting).  Branch quotes NHL Commissioner Gary Bettman as stating the fol-
lowing proposition: “If you polled our fans, probably more would say they think it’s
a part of the game and should be retained[.]” See id.
26. See Gopnik, supra note 25 (noting that violence in hockey stems from tra- R
dition: “this is the way we play our game, it’s part of our culture, [and] it’s intrinsic
to its enjoyment”). See also Scott Burnside, NHL to Discuss Ban on Goalie Fights,
ESPN (Nov. 11, 2013, 4:07 PM), http://espn.go.com/nhl/story/_/id/9961982/
nhl-general-managers-discuss-ban-goaltender-fights-gary-bettman-says (discussing
NHL commissioner’s position on hockey’s tradition of fighting).  Burnside reports
that when asked whether fighting has a place in professional hockey, Gary
Bettman, the NHL commissioner, gave the following response: “Fighting has been
part of the game . . . .  I think fighting acts as a thermostat to keep other things
[orderly].  I’d rather them be punching each other than swinging the sticks at
each other.” See id. (second alteration in original).
27. See NHL OFFICIAL RULES, supra note 24, § 6, RULE 46.2 (defining aggressor
player as “the player who continues to throw punches in an attempt to inflict pun-
ishment on his opponent who is in a defenseless position or who is an unwilling
combatant”); id. §§ 6-9 (outlining types of penalties and types of fouls).  The
NHL’s Rule 46 generally outlines the rules for fighting. See id. § 4.
8
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the-ice fistfights, that seem like boxing matches, in which more
than one player engages, are in a league of their own.28
Players who engaged in these on-the-ice fistfights are known as
enforcers because they purposely intimidate opponents through
brute force.29  While the role of enforcers can be valuable to teams
for multiple reasons, the case of Boogaard’s role has raised ques-
tions to the necessity of enforcers to enhance an NHL team’s per-
formance.30  Particularly, the benefit of an enforcer on a team
unlikely outweighs the potential physical costs and consequences of
28. See Jamie Fitzpatrick, History of Hockey Fights, http://proicehockey.about
.com/od/rules/a/History-Of-Hockey-Fights.htm (last visited Sep. 14, 2014) (men-
tioning that fighting in hockey has occurred since hockey rules were established).
Fitzpatrick acknowledges that the NHL imposes “penalties [on] players who attack
with their sticks, or those who go after an unwilling or unaware opponent.” See id.
However, “a fistfight between two willing combatants has long been accepted as a
‘natural’ part of hockey and a tactic for motivating team mates and intimidating
opponents.” See id. For annual NHL fight statistics since 2001, generally see NHL
Fight Stats, HOCKEYFIGHTS.COM, http://www.hockeyfights.com/stats/ (last visited
Jan. 15, 2015). See also Branch II, supra note 6 (discussing NHL’s consideration of
increasing penalty for on-ice fighting and quoting Commissioner Bettman as stat-
ing “there doesn’t seem to be overwhelming appetite or desire to [increase the
penalty]”).
29. See Jones & Stewart, supra note 23 (discussing role of enforcers in NHL
and their apparent value).  Boogaard’s suit described him as an enforcer for the
Wild and Rangers because “[he] engage[d] in fist-fights with players from the op-
posing team, on the ice, during a game.” See Complaint, supra note 6, at 1-2. See
generally Michael McCarthy, The Fight Game: NHL’s Rules of Engagement, USA TODAY,
Apr. 5, 2007, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/hockey/nhl/2007-04-04-
fighting_N.htm (discussing role of Colton Orr, NHL player on New York Rangers,
as “enforcer” that brutally knocked out Todd Fedoruk of Philadelphia Flyers dur-
ing first twenty seconds of game as retribution for Fedoruk’s hits on Rangers’ cap-
tain Jaromir Jagr during previous game between Flyers and Rangers).
Interestingly, Fedoruk commented that “Orr had to send a message . . . . [he] did
the right thing . . . . [h]e had to let his teammates know they would be protected
and safe, that they wouldn’t get run by [the Flyers].” See id.  For a more thorough
discussion of examples of enforcers in the NHL see Rob Flis, 10 of the Highest-Paid
NHL Enforcers for 2013, THE RICHEST (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.therichest.com/
sports/hockey-sports/top-10-highest-paid-nhl-enforcers-for-2013/.
30. See Adam Gretz, The Enforcer Fallacy: Hockey’s Fighting Specialists Don’t Protect
Anyone, http://regressing.deadspin.com/the-enforcer-fallacy-hockeys-fighting-spe-
cialists-don-1442618145 (Oct. 11, 2013, 14:00 EST) (opining that NHL’s problem
is not with fighting but rather with teams’ employment of enforcers “whose only
tangible skill is their ability to punch another player in the face”).  Gretz highlights
the career of Pittsburgh Penguin Steve MacIntyre, an enforcer, that “[i]n [ninety-
one] career games at the NHL level he has recorded four points (two goals, two
assists) and tallied 175 penalty minutes . . . . [o]nly [twenty-one] times has he
played more than five minutes in a single game[.]” See id.  For a discussion of how
Boogaard’s death may impact the role of enforcers, see Branch II, supra note 6
(discussing implications of Boogaard’s death along with Rick Rypien and Wade
Belak, whose combined deaths “provided a backdrop for further debate about the
role of fighting and the toll on enforcers[ ]”).
9
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acting as an enforcer.31  Although findings show that enforcers face
an increased risk of injury, the NHL seems hesitant to ban fighting
or simply increase the penalty for fighting.32
B. An Enforcer’s Dilemma: The Case of Derek Boogaard
In a game on December 9, 2010, when Boogaard played for the
Rangers, he engaged in an on-ice fight and suffered a concussion; it
was the last game he would ever play.33  Boogaard, an enforcer
throughout his entire NHL career, was prescribed opioids for his
ensuing pain, which led to Boogaard abusing opioids and to his
31. See Dater I, supra note 5 (discussing deaths of three enforcers in 2011); R
Muir, supra note 16 (discussing George Parros, an enforcer, and concussion he R
sustained in fighting). See also Adrian Dater, Former Avalanche Enforcer Scott Parker
Battling Effects of Concussions, THE DENVER POST (Dec. 1, 2013) [hereinafter Dater
II], http://www.denverpost.com/avalance/ci_24631033/former-avs-enforcer-scott-
parker-battling-effects-concussions (detailing daily struggles of Scott Parker, re-
tired NHL enforcer that played for Colorado Avalanche, who sustained multiple
concussions).  Dater reports that Parker “estimates he participated in around 400
fights, absorbed at least 4,000 punches to the head and face, and suffered 20-25
concussions[.]” See id. Although Parker has been retired from the NHL for nearly
six years, he “frequently is debilitated by seizures[,] . . . . wear[s] sunglasses most of
the time” to prevent light-induced, incapacitating headaches, and “[w]hen [he]
looks down, he cannot ‘track’ objects.  Otherwise, he gets dizzy and nauseous.” See
id. Nonetheless, the importance of fighting and enforcers in hockey is a hotly
debated subject. See Elizabeth Merrill, Derek Boogaard Felt the Pain, Too, ESPN OUT-
SIDETHELINES (May 29, 2011, 6:10 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/otl/
news/story?id=6598296 (quoting sports author Ross Bernstein as stating following
about role of enforcers in hockey: “you’re not going to win [without enforc-
ers] . . . . [like]  a kicker in football . . . . [y]ou might not think they’re athletes, but
you can’t win without him”).  Merrill notes that Bernstein “believes that enforcers
are integral, even though rule changes in the NHL in recent years have diminished
their place in the game.” See id. Speaking on Boogaard, Merrill notes Bernstein as
stating the following: “Derek was a specialist. Just his presence was enough to keep
teams honest. They know that if they mess with [Marian] Gaborik, then
Boog[aard’s] coming off the bench.” See id. (first alteration in original). Marian
Gaborik was a former NHL player for the Rangers from 2009-2012 and during the
2012-2013 season. See Marian Gaborik Stats, ESPN NHL, http://espn.go.com/nhl/
player/stats/_/id/290/marian-gaborik (last visited Sep. 14, 2014).
32. See Branch II, supra note 6 (discussing that NHL commissioner has not
come out in support of increasing penalty time for fighting based on commis-
sioner’s view of lack of support from fans and players). See also Dater II, supra note
31 (noting NHL has implemented rules that discourage fighting, but NHL has not R
banned fighting outright).  Dater discusses the NHL rules “requiring any player
who enters the league now to wear a protective visor and eliminating fights in the
final five minutes [of the game].” See id.  In the future, the NHL might ban fight-
ing between goalies. See Burnside, supra note 26 (discussing future meeting among
league’s general managers to determine whether new rule prohibiting goalies
from fighting should be implemented).  According to Burnside, this new rule
came about because of a fight between Ray Emergy, a goalie for the Philadelphia
Flyers, and Braden Holtby, a goalie for the Washington Capitals. See id.
33. See Complaint, supra note 6, paras. 16-17 (discussing last game that Boo- R
gaard played).
10
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accidental, fatal overdose of oxycodone and alcohol in his apart-
ment.34  Boogaard’s case pointedly brings attention to two potential
issues that enforcers have faced and could face in the future due to
the high rate at which they sustain physical injuries: opioid addic-
tion and CTE.35
1. Boogaard’s Dark Road to Opioid Addiction36
Boogaard’s first experience with opioids as a professional
hockey player came on October 16, 2008, when NHL team physi-
cians first prescribed him 432 pain pills of Hydrocodone for a tooth
fracture sustained in an on-ice fight.37  Next, from April 14, 2009 to
April 30, 2009, Boogaard received 150 pills of Oxycodone and/or
Percocet and forty pills of Hydrocodone after undergoing nasal sur-
gery and right shoulder surgery.38  After this, Boogaard allegedly
34. See supra notes 6-7 (discussing general information of Boogaard’s case and R
Boogaard’s NHL career); Complaint, supra note 6, at 2 (alleging Boogaard “was
provided copious amounts of prescription pain medications, sleeping pills, and
painkiller injections by NHL team’s physicians, dentists, trainers, and staff[ ]”).
35. For a general discussion of opioid addiction see infra notes 36-49 and ac- R
companying text.  For a discussion of CTE, see infra notes 50-53 and accompanying R
text.
36. For a discussion regarding opioids and their addictive effects, see Treating
Opiate Addiction, Part I: Detoxification and Maintenance, HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL,
http://www.health.harvard.edu/newsweek/Treating_opiate_addiction_Detoxifica
tion_and_maintenance.htm (last visited Sep. 14, 2014) (“Opiates are outranked
only by alcohol as humanity’s oldest, most widespread, and most persistent drug
problem[.]”).  Opiates are mainly used when over-the-counter drugs for pain
prove ineffective. See id.  Essentially, “opioid drugs work by binding to opioid
receptors in the brain, spinal cord, and other areas of the body [and] reduce the
sending of pain messages to the brain and reduce feelings of pain.” See id. Some
common opioid prescription drugs include the following: codeine, fentanyl,
hydrocodone, hydromorphone, meperidine, methadone, morphine, and
oxycodone. See Opioid (Narcotic) Pain Medications, WEBMD, http://www.webmd
.com/pain-management/guide/narcotic-pain-medications (last visited Sep. 14,
2014)  (describing opiates generally, side effects, and how to discuss using opiates
with one’s physician).
37. See Complaint, supra note 6, para. 55 (listing in chart corresponding quan- R
tities and dosage of Hydrocodone or Vicodin and prescribing physician).
38. See Complaint, supra note 6, paras. 57, 58, 61  (charting corresponding R
dates drugs were dispensed, quantities, and dosage of oxycodone or hydrocodone,
and prescribing physicians). See id. para. 91 (describing Boogaard “often ingesting
up to 10 [pain pills] per day”). See also DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
(DEA), CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 2, 2015), available at
http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/schedules/orangebook/c_cs_alpha.pdf  (list-
ing Oxycodone as Schedule II controlled substance).  For information regarding
how drugs, substances, and certain chemicals are classified, see DRUG ENFORCE-
MENT ADMINISTRATION (DEA), DRUG SCHEDULES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 2,
2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/dea/druginfo/ds.shtml.  Drugs, sub-
stances, and chemicals are classified according to their respective abuse rates,
which is a determinative factor. See id.  According to the DEA, Schedule II drugs
such as oxycodone “are defined as drugs with a high potential for abuse, less abuse
11
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became addicted to opioids, began abusing pain medications and
sleeping pills, and was placed in SABH in September 2009.39  Upon
discharge from the SABH program, Boogaard participated in an
NHL-mandated “Aftercare Program” in which he “was to refrain
from all opioid and Ambien drug use and submit to random drug
testing.”40  During Boogaard’s 2009-2010 season with the Minnesota
Wild, his drug tests were negative.41
Despite Boogaard’s father notifying NHL officials that Boo-
gaard had relapsed, and Boogaard’s conversation with the Rangers
about his addiction prior to signing, physicians prescribed Boo-
gaard an additional 366 prescription pain medications and other
controlled substances during the 2010-11 season.42  From January
2011 to March 2011, Boogaard’s urine tested positive for Ox-
ymorphone, Hydromorphone, and Hydrocode in six urine tests,
potential than Schedule I drugs, with use potentially leading to severe psychologi-
cal or physical dependence.  These drugs are also considered dangerous.” See
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION (DEA), DEFINITION OF CONTROLLED SUB-
STANCES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/schedules/
(last visited Sep. 14, 2014) (defining drug classifications).  Schedule I drugs, sub-
stances, or chemicals have “no currently accepted medical use and a high potential
for abuse.” See id.
39. See Complaint, supra note 6, paras. 64, 66 (discussing Boogaard’s man-
dated placement into SABH program signaled that NHL knew of Boogaard’s ad-
diction to prescription pain medications).  “Addiction . . . . is characterized by one
or more of the following behaviors: [1] poor control over drug use[,] [2] compul-
sive drug use[,] [3] continued use of a drug despite physical, mental and/or social
harm[,] [and 4] [a] craving for the drug.” See Karen Richards, Opioids: Addiction
vs. Dependence, http://www.healthcentral.com/chronic-pain/coping-27488-5.html
(last visited Mar. 7, 2014).  Richards advances that certain of the following behav-
iors may suggest that a person’s physical dependence on an opioid has turned into
addiction: “[1] Taking medications more frequently or at higher dosages than pre-
scribed. [2] Ingesting drugs in ways other than directed such as crushing, snorting
or injecting. [3] Frequent reports of lost or stolen prescriptions.  [4] Doctor shop-
ping.  [5] Using multiple pharmacies.” See id.
40. See Complaint, supra note 6, paras. 64-65 (“On [Sept.] 23, 2009, as part of
the SABH program, Boogaard was checked into ‘The Canyon’ rehabilitation facil-
ity in California for in-patient treatment of his developed opioid and sleeping pill
addiction.”). See id. para. 63 (stating Boogaard “purchased and was provided Ox-
ycodone off-market from multiple sources”). See also Branch II, supra note 6, at 4
(discussing testimony from Boogaard’s best friend in New York, Devin Wilson, who
stated that Boogaard “usually on Sunday evenings . . . . met a man in a parking lot
[in Long Island] . . . and bought Ziploc bags full of painkillers”).
41. See Complaint, supra note 6, para. 115, at 23 (stating Boogaard’s tests were R
negative when he played for Wild).
42. See Complaint, supra note 6, paras. 116, 118, 120, at 23 (listing in chart R
quantities of Hydrocodone, Zolpidem, and Ambien prescriptions given to Boo-
gaard during the 2010-11 season with the Rangers).  According to Boogaard’s fa-
ther, although Boogaard had been in a rehab program since September 2009,
Boogaard’s father would find prescription pill bottles in Boogaard’s bathroom pre-
scribed by Rangers’ physicians. See Branch II, supra note 6. R
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but neither the team nor the league suspended him.43  After the
sixth positive urine test, the SABH program placed Boogaard into
Stage One intervention.44  On April 4, 2011, during a team practice,
“he could not stay up on his skates, fell numerous times, and was
kicked out of practice.”45
The next day, he was admitted into the Authentic Recovery
Center (“ARC”) in California for opioid dependence.46  While re-
ceiving treatment at ARC, Boogaard resisted treatment and showed
indifference in therapy sessions; he “view[ed the] treatment epi-
sode as something he must do to comply with NHL.”47  A day
before his death on May 12, 2011, even though Boogaard was gen-
erally non-compliant with the ARC’s treatment protocol, he was re-
leased to attend his sister’s college graduation.48  He overdosed on
pain medications and was found dead on May 13, 2011.49
43. See Complaint, supra note 6, paras. 122-127, at 24-25 (listing dates Boo-
gaard’s urine tested positive for pain medications).  According to the chart, during
the urine tests, Boogaard was only prescribed Ambien CR and Zolpidem ER, which
are not pain medications but medications for sleep problems. See Complaint, supra
note 6, at 15 (listing Zolpidem ER and Ambien CR prescribed starting from Dec. R
24, 2010 until April 8, 2011).
44. See Complaint, supra note 6, para. 128, at 25-26. For a discussion of SABH R
program, see infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. R
45. See id. para. 129, at 26 (discussing Boogaard’s alleged impairment at
practice).
46. See id. para. 130, at 26 (discussing admittance into SABH program).
47. See id. para. 131, at 26 (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing
Boogaard’s lack of participation in SABH program).
48. See id. para. 140, at 27 (discussing physicians releasing Boogaard from
SABH program).
49. See id. paras. 141-142, at 27 (discussing details of Boogaard’s death).  A
“[p]ost-mortem toxicology [report] revealed that [ ] Boogaard had a blood alco-
hol count of .180 gm/dL and a blood opioid quantification of .14mg/L of Ox-
ycodone.” See Complaint, supra note 6, para. 143, at 27. Boogaard’s death not only
raised awareness of issues concerning enforcers but also of a rising problem of
opioid related deaths in the United States:
In 2010, the most recent year with complete statistics, drug overdose
deaths killed more people than auto accidents in the U.S. [m]ore than
16,000 of these deaths were from opioid relapses and overdoses, com-
pared to just over 4,000 in 1999.  The U.S. Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention in Atlanta, which monitors health trends, classifies opioid
addiction as an ‘epidemic’ that, together with heroin (another opioid),
has killed 125,000 Americans in the last decade.
Lester Munson, Enforcer’s Family vs. the NHL, ESPN (May 15, 2013), http://espn.go
.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/9275330/looking-answers-derek-boogaard-death (dis-
cussing Boogaard’s case against NHL generally).
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2. Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy: Post-Mortem Brain Analysis is
Bad News for Enforcers
CTE is a “progressive degenerative” brain disease found in
those “with a history of repetitive brain trauma[,]” including ath-
letes, and it can only be diagnosed post-mortem by analyzing brain
tissue.50  CTE is believed to be cause by such repetitive brain
trauma, “including symptomatic concussions as well as asymptom-
atic subconcussive hits to the head[,] [which] trigger[ ] progressive
degeneration of the brain tissue, including build-up of an abnormal
protein called tau.”51  Progression of CTE “can begin months, years,
or even decades after the last concussion or end of active athletic
involvement.”52  Some of the symptoms associated with CTE in-
clude: “memory loss, confusion, impaired judgment, paranoia, im-
pulse control problems, aggression, depression, and, eventually,
progressive dementia.”53
Physicians from the Boston University School of Medicine,
Center for the Study of Traumatic Encephalopathy [“BUCTE
50. See SPORTS LEGACY INSTITUTE, CHRONIC TRAUMATIC ENCEPHALOPATHY,
http://www.sportslegacy.org/research/cte/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2014) (discussing
general information about CTE, its history, and progression). “The VA CSTE Brain
Bank contains more brains diagnosed with CTE than have ever been reported in
the world combined.”  Boston University School of Medicine, Center for the Study
of Traumatic Encephalopathy, Boston University Researchers Reports NHL Player Derek
Boogaard Had Evidence of Early Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy, BU CTE CENTER
(Dec. 6, 2011), [hereinafter “BUCTE”], http://www.bu.edu/cte/news/press-re-
leases/december-6-2011/ (discussing scientific findings and conclusions that can
be drawn from examining Boogaard’s brain tissue).  The CTE Center “was estab-
lished in 1996 as one of 29 centers in the US funded by the National Institutes of
Health to advance research on Alzheimer’s disease and related conditions . . . the
CTE Center conducts high-impact, innovative research on Chronic Traumatic En-
cephalopathy and other long-term consequences of repetitive brain trauma in ath-
letes and military personnel.” See BUCTE, About, http://www.bu.edu/cte/about/
(last visited Mar. 7, 2014).
51. See BUCTE, What is CTE?, http://www.bu.edu/cte/about/what-is-cte/
(last visited Feb. 23, 2015) [hereinafter “What is CTE?”] (discussing CTE and its
progression).  Boxers exhibited the first signs of being affected by CTE since the
1920s, as CTE occurs when there is “repetitive brain trauma including symptomatic
concussions as well as asymptomatic subconcussive hits to the head.” See id.
52. See What is CTE?, supra note 51.  Even though boxers were the first to
exhibit signs of CTE, recently, published scientific reports have confirmed CTE “in
retired professional football players and other athletes who have a history of repeti-
tive brain trauma.” See id.  Recently, CTE can even be diagnosed in living people.
See William Weinbaum & Steve Delsohn, Dorsett, Others Show Signs of CTE, ESPN
(Nov. 7, 2013), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/9931754/former-nfl-
stars-tony-dorsett-leonard-marshall-joe-delameilleure-show-indicators-cte-resulting-
football-concussions (discussing signs of CTE diagnosis of NFL Pro Football Hall of
Famers Tony Dorsett, Joe DeLamielleure, and former NFL All-Pro Leonard Mar-
shall through brain scans and clinical evaluations).
53. See What is CTE?, supra note 51 (discussing progression of CTE and
symptoms).
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Center”] examined Boogaard’s brain tissue and found that he suf-
fered from Stage II CTE because of the repeated blows to the head
during his NHL career.54  As examined, “the severity of his brain
changes was more advanced than most other athletes of similar age
with CTE examined by Dr. McKee.”55  According to the examina-
tion, for the two years leading up to Boogaard’s death, he not only
“dealt with drug addiction” but also “exhibited abnormal behaviors,
including emotional instability and problems with impulse control,
along with short-term memory problems and disorientation[.]”56
These behaviors could have served as red flags, and Boogaard’s
complaint alleged that the NHL should have known that he, as an
enforcer, was more susceptible to injuries and “brain damage due
to concussive and subconcussive brain trauma,” and that he “had an
increased risk of developing addiction to prescription pain
medications.”57
“The association between Boogaard’s brain pathology and
[the] . . . behavioral changes and memory problems he exper-
ienced in his last two years, is unclear[,]” because it is generally
“unknown whether substance abuse is caused by the impulse con-
trol problems associated with CTE[.]”58  However, in a statement
regarding Boogaard’s CTE diagnosis, Dr. Robert Cantu, the
BUCTE Co-Director, stated that “based on the small sample of en-
forcers we have studied, it is possible that frequently engaging in
fistfights as a hockey player may put one at increased risk for this
54. See Complaint, supra note 6, para. 26, at 23. Dr. Ann McKee, a “professor
of neurology and pathology at Boston University School of Medicine, and the di-
rector of the CTE brain bank” located in Virginia, diagnosed Boogaard with mild
CTE. See BUCTE, supra note 50.  Playing for the New York Rangers in 2010, Boo-
gaard’s fitness coming out of rehab was questionable and “[t]eam officials ex-
pressed concern about [Boogaard’s] effectiveness on the ice, even his safety in a
fight[.]” See Branch II, supra note 6.  In November 2010, Boogaard “beat[ ] Phila- R
delphia’s Jody Shelley” and also “pounded Edmonton’s Steve MacIntyre[,]” but
the bout left Boogaard sidelined for a game with a “broke[n] nose and most
likely . . . a concussion.” See id.  Further, on December 9, 2010, Ottawa enforcer,
Matt Carkner, “cracked Boogaard’s face with a right hand[;]” in response, Boo-
gaard, uncharacteristically, “turned his head away and held on to Carkner . . . .
[and] did not throw another punch.” See Branch II, supra note 6 (highlighting at R
least three videos showing Boogaard fighting and discussing how Boogaard’s “fam-
ily and friends noticed an indifference in his fighting”).
55. See BUCTE, supra note 50 (discussing possible scientific findings and con-
clusions drawn from examining Boogaard’s brain tissue).
56. See id. (discussing CTE symptoms that could have led to Boogaard’s
death).
57. Complaint, supra note 6, paras. 48-50, at 7 (discussing Boogaard’s status as R
enforcer for the NHL).
58. BUCTE, supra note 50 (discussing potential possibility of causal relation-
ship between Boogaard’s opioid addiction and his early onset of CTE).
15
Romero: Check to the Head: The Tragic Death of NHL Enforcer Derek Boogaar
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
36293-vls_22-1 Sheet No. 151 Side B      04/07/2015   08:38:16
36293-vls_22-1 Sheet No. 151 Side B      04/07/2015   08:38:16
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-1\VLS107.txt unknown Seq: 16 31-MAR-15 13:14
286 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: p. 271
degenerative brain disease.”59  Furthermore, “even if [CTE] was not
directly affecting Boogaard’s quality of life and overall functioning
before he died, it is possible it could have in the future.”60
C. 2005 and 2012 NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement
and the SABH Program
The NHLPA, on behalf of the NHL players, bargains with team
owners to establish a binding contract, known as a CBA, between
the parties.61  The CBA “sets the terms and conditions of employ-
ment of all professional hockey players playing in the NHL as well
as the respective rights of the NHL Clubs,” and remains in effect for
just under ten years.62  The 2012 CBA, which replaced the 2005
CBA, was ratified on January 12, 2013.63  Generally, CBAs give
teams the exclusive right to “designate the doctors and hospitals
responsible for furnishing medical treatment” for their players.64
Both CBAs address a performance enhancing substance program,
but fail to incorporate a program that addresses the use of opioids
or other addictive substances.65  Instead, the CBAs state that the
SABH program will continue to handle any substance abuse, behav-
ioral, or domestic issues.66
59. See id. (discussing enforcers have heightened risk of head injuries because
they often fight).
60. See id. (discussing whether Boogaard’s symptoms of CTE would have
showed up later in his life prior to his death).
61. See Nick DiCello, No Pain, No Gain, No Compensation: Exploiting Professional
Athletes through Substandard Medical Care Administered by Team Physicians, 49 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 507, 522 (2001) (citations omitted) (discussing team physicians’ duty of
care, standard of care, and claims that can be brought against team physicians
alleging medical malpractice).
62. See Collective Bargaining Agreement, NHLPA, http://www.nhlpa.com/inside-
nhlpa/collective-bargaining-agreement (last visited Jan. 15, 2015) (containing in-
formation regarding NHLPA and CBA).
63. See id. (discussing 2012 CBA).  For purposes of this Comment, the 2012
CBA is only mentioned to highlight that there was no change in the SABH pro-
gram’s terms from the 2005 CBA and this Comment focuses on the 2005 CBA
because Boogaard’s suit brought in May 2013 was under the 2005 CBA. See Com-
plaint, supra note 6, paras. 28-33.
64. Teresa Herbert, Are Player Injuries Adequately Compensated, 7 SPORTS L.J.
243, 247 (2000) (discussing collective bargaining agreements and workers’ com-
pensation laws).
65. See 2005 CBA, supra note 13, art. 47, at 133-35 (outlining NHL’s perform- R
ance enhancing drugs program); 2012 CBA, supra note 13, art. 47, at 188-94
(same).
66. See 2012 CBA, supra note 13, art. 47.4(a); 2005 CBA, supra note 13, art. R
47.3. A committee of NHLPA members and NHL representatives took on the re-
sponsibility of “establish[ing] an education program on the dangers of perform-
ance-enhancing substances[,]” but the committee left the responsibility of
handling “substance abuse and behavioral and domestic issues involving players
requiring employee assistance” to the SABH program. See NHL, NHLPA Team Up
16
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Although the CBA does not list opioids as a banned substance,
the 2012 CBA states, “the joint committee will agree on a Prohib-
ited Substances List [which] will include performance-enhancing
substances on the list maintained by the World Anti-Doping
Agency . . . .”67  The World Anti-Doping Agency (“WADA”) prohib-
its the use of narcotics including Oxycodone and Hydromorphine,
but NHL physicians continue to prescribe these narcotics to players
like Boogaard.68  In accordance with the performance enhancing
substances program, the NHL imposes penalties on players that test
positive for using performance-enhancing substances.69  While the
NHL could also add narcotics to the prohibited substance list, noth-
ing indicates that it will.70
According to Boogaard’s complaint, the SABH program fol-
lows a “defined regimen[.]”71  Any player that enters the SABH pro-
Against Performance-Enhancing Substances, NHL (July 22, 2005), http://www.nhl
.com/nhlhq/cba/drug_testing072205.html (discussing performance enhancing
substances program).
67. See Press Release, NHL, NHL, NHLPA Team Up Against Performance-
Enhancing Substances, NHL  (July 22, 2005) (on file with author) (discussing
terms of new NHL CBA). See also NHLPA, supra note 12, at Art. 47. For more
information regarding the WDA, see About WADA, available at http://www.wada-
ama.org/en/About-WADA/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2014).
68. For a complete list of WADA prohibited substances, see THE WORLD ANTI-
DOPING CODE, THE 2014 PROHIBITED LIST, available at https://wada-main-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/resources/files/WADA-Revised-2014-Prohibited-List-EN
.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2014).  See supra note 38 (listing opioids Boogaard re-
ceived from team physicians).
69. See 2012 CBA, supra note 13 at Article 47.7 in 2012 CBA and Article 47.7 in R
2012 CBA. The penalties for using performance enhancing substances are as fol-
lows: “1) for the first positive test, a suspension of twenty NHL Games without pay,
and mandatory referral to the SABH Program for evaluation and possible treat-
ment, 2) for the second positive test, a suspension of sixty NHL games without pay,
and mandatory referral to the SABH Program for evaluation and possible treat-
ment, and 3) for the third positive test, a ‘permanent’ suspension,” although the
player has an opportunity to “reapply for discretionary reinstatement after a mini-
mum period of two years.” “The policy [i.e., SABH program’s policy] is by far the
most lenient, player-friendly drug policy of all the major sports leagues.” See Robert
F. Moore, The Interaction Between the Americans with Disabilities Act and Drug and Alco-
hol Addiction, 16 SPORTS LAW. J. 231, 243 (2009) (analyzing drug abuse policies of
major leagues such as NFL, NBA, MLB, and NHL) (citations omitted).
70. See 2012 CBA, supra note 13, at 506 (discussing addendum agreement for R
“illegal” stimulants and amphetamines, such as cocaine, and “stimulants/amphet-
amines” that require “licensed physician[‘s]” prescription to be added to Prohib-
ited Substances List).
71. See Complaint, supra note 6, para. 111 (outlining guidelines for players
entering SABH program).  A player in the SABH program “is placed in Stage One
of four defined stages for substance abuse.” See id.  “A Stage One player continues
to receive his full NHL salary, with no penalties, so long as he fully complies with
the treatment and follow-up care prescribed.” See id.
A player that violates the Stage One treatment or follow-up care program
is placed in Stage Two.  A player in Stage Two is suspended without pay
17
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gram “receive[s] a comprehensive medical and psychological
evaluation by one of the Program Doctors.”72  Though not the case
with Boogaard, players are allowed to check themselves into the
SABH program.73  The SABH program has procedures for treating
and penalizing players that do not comply with treatment, however,
it “has been a somewhat invisible entity.”74  After the deaths of
Rypien and Boogaard, Commissioner Gary Bettman stated that he
expected the league to review the SABH program and possibly
make some changes.75  Further, even NHLPA union executive Ma-
thieu Schneider called the SABH program “very strong[,]” but rec-
ognized that the NHLPA must work to improve the program.76
According to Boogaard’s complaint, the 2005 CBA does not
address the following issues: the NHL’s duty to its players in ad-
ministering controlled substances; NHL procedure for administer-
ing controlled substances to its players; the NHL’s duty to its players
pursuant to the SABH program; or the NHL’s duty to its players to
during active treatment and is eligible for reinstatement upon recom-
mendation of the Program Doctors. A player that violates Stage Two treat-
ment or follow-up care program is placed in Stage Three.  A player in
Stage Three is suspended without pay for a minimum of six (6) calendar
months and is eligible for reinstatement upon recommendation of the
Program Doctors.  A player that violates Stage Three treatment or follow-
up care program is placed in Stage Four.  A player in Stage Four is sus-
pended without pay for a minimum of one (1) season. Reinstatement is at
the discretion of the NHL.
Id. (internal tabulation omitted) (outlining program requirements and
expectations).
72. See id. (discussing medical procedures of SABH program physicians).
73. See NHLPA, Tootoo Enters Substance Abuse/Behavioural Health Program (Dec.
27, 2010), http://www.nhlpa.com/news/tootoo-enters-substance-abusebehaviour
al-health-program (discussing Nashville Predators, Jordin Tootoo “voluntarily
enter[ing] in-patient care as part of the [SABH program]”). While in the SABH
program, Tootoo will “receive his full salary and benefits and will have no penalty
imposed, provided he complies with his prescribed treatment and follow-up care
program.” See id.
74. See Colin Bruckel, CBA SABH: Program, THE HOSERS (Sept. 1, 2011), http:/
/www.thehosers.com/2011/09/cba-sabh-program.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2014)
(recognizing that despite SABH’s privacy concerns with releasing information
about its program, structure of program can still be divulged because it does not
infringe on anyone’s personal privacy).
75. See NHL to Look at Program in Light of Deaths, ESPN, Aug. 17, 2011, [herein-
after “NHL to Look at Program”] http://espn.go.com/nhl/story/_/id/6871384/
gary-bettman-says-nhl-union-evaluate-behavioral-program (mentioning Rypien and
Boogaard both spent time in SABH program before their deaths).  For details re-
garding Rypien’s death, see Dater I, supra note 5, and accompanying text. R
76. See NHL to Look at Program, supra note 75 (quoting Mathieu Schneider as
stating the following about Rypien’s death: “Maybe it would have been better had
Rick been able to lean on some teammates and guys there for support. . . .  But
those type of things have always been kind of taboo. You just don’t talk about it.”).
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monitor their general health.77  Unfortunately, Boogaard’s claims
against the NHL and NHLPA relating to the 2005 CBA and SABH
are federally preempted under the Labor Management Relations
Act (“LMRA”).78  Courts often interpret CBA provisions broadly;
therefore, if the players’ claims are “remotely related” to the
league’s CBA, the claims are preempted.79  Boogaard’s abuse of
opioids did not trigger the imposition of penalties pursuant to the
CBA, which could imply that the NHL does not consider opioid
abuse to be as serious of a problem as the use of performance en-
hancing drugs.80  The question stands whether the NHL CBA
77. See Complaint, supra note 6, paras. 29-35 (discussing Boogaard’s claims
against SABH program under 2005 CBA).
78. See Nelson v. NHL, 2014 WL 656793, (N.D. Ill. Feb 2, 2014) (denying
Boogaard’s motion to remand case to state court because third and fourth counts
of Boogaard’s claims were completely preempted under § 301 of Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act (LMRA)). “Suits for violation of contracts between an em-
ployer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce. . . or between any such labor organization, may be brought in any
district court of the United States . . . .” See 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a). See also National
Labor Relations Act, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/re-
sources/national-labor-relations-act (last visited Mar 7. 2014).  Under the LMRA,
the NHL and NHLPA, which are considered labor organizations, can bring their
case in federal court because federal courts have jurisdiction over the labor dis-
putes. Id. The NHL argued that the suit must be dismissed because the CBA (col-
lective bargaining agreement) and federal labor law preempt the claims of
Boogaard. See Travis Yost, The NHL/SABH Miserably Failed Derek Boogaard, EKLUND’S
HOCKEY, LLC (July 30, 2013, 2:48 PM) http://www.hockeybuzz.com/blog/Travis-
Yost/ How-Did-the-NHL-and-SABH-Fail-Derek-Boogaard/134/53114.  Boogaard’s
lawyers, however, could respond in asserting that “the 2005 CBA does not address
the NHL’s duties to its players to monitor their general health.” See Paul D. Ander-
son, NHL Concussion Litigation –The Boogaard Family Strikes First, (May 13, 2013)
http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/?p=1446.  In other words, a judge should not
be required to interpret the provisions of the CBA. See id.  See Smith v. Houston
Oilers, 87 F.3d 717 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that players’ state tort law claims
against professional team were preempted by federal labor laws, which required
that arbitration resolution measures be exhausted before commencing civil suit).
The court held that the suit’s dispute should be dealt with under the CBA. See
Sherwin v. Indianapolis Colts, Inc., 752 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding
that former NFL player’s claims against professional team were preempted under
federal labor law because they were substantially related to NFL’s CBA). In some
instances, team physicians are partial owners of sports franchises. See Steve P. Ca-
landrillo, Sports Medicine Conflicts: Team Physicians vs. Athlete Patients, 50 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 185, 192-203 (2005) (discussing issue of conflict of interest where partial own-
ers are also team physicians).  For example, “Arthur Pappas, who served as  both
part owner and team physician for the Boston Red Sox[,]” was subject “to player
and public criticism that he was compromising his athletes’ best interests for the
short-term benefit of the team.” See id., at 193-94 (discussing Pappas’ role as both
team owner and physician).
79. See Herbert, supra note 64, at 252-54 (noting that “[w]ithout legal responsi- R
bility, teams have great latitude to abuse their players.”).
80. See Complaint, supra note 6, at paras. 171-78, at 33-35 (describing multiple
instances where Boogaard tested positive for opioids but was not suspended).
19
Romero: Check to the Head: The Tragic Death of NHL Enforcer Derek Boogaar
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
36293-vls_22-1 Sheet No. 153 Side B      04/07/2015   08:38:16
36293-vls_22-1 Sheet No. 153 Side B      04/07/2015   08:38:16
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-1\VLS107.txt unknown Seq: 20 31-MAR-15 13:14
290 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: p. 271
should have procedures that address the health of its players and
potential remedies for players incurring injuries.81
III. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND HOW PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES ARE
GIVEN THE SHORT END OF THE STICK
A. Relationship Among Teams, Team Physicians,
and Team Players
Team physicians have an employer-employee relationship with
their respective teams.82  Typically, the team selects its own physi-
cians who usually specialize in internal medicine or orthopedic sur-
gery.83  Although the definition of a team physician is unclear, the
team is involved in paying the physician’s salary.84  Because the
team is the employer, the team has the power to hire, fire, and pay
the physician to treat its players.85  Therefore, the physician’s rela-
81. For a discussion of potential remedies for injured NHL players, see infra
notes 168-192 and accompanying text. R
82. See Calandrillo, supra note 78, at 190 (discussing the employer-employee
relationship between team physicians and athletes, as well as the legal implica-
tions).  Commentator John Branch reported in the New York Times that after Boo-
gaard’s case, the SABH program’s co-directors, Dr. Lewis and Dr. Shaw, referred
all questions to the NHL and it provided the following written statement:
Under the auspices of the NHL/NHLPA Substance Abuse and Behavioral
Health Program, an NHL player receives individualized — and confiden-
tial — medical treatment, care and counseling.  Based on what we know,
Derek Boogaard at all times received medical treatment, care and coun-
seling that was deemed appropriate for the specifics of his situation.
John Branch, In Hockey Enforcer’s Descent, a Flood of Prescription Drugs, N.Y. Times,
June 4, 2012, at A1 [hereinafter Branch IV], available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/06/04/sports/hockey/in-hockey-enforcers-descent-a-flood-of-prescription-
drugs.html?pagewanted=all.
83. See Matthew J. Mitten, Team Physicians as Co-Employees: A Prescription That
Deprives Professional Athletes of an Adequate Remedy for Sports Medicine Malpractice, 50
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 211, 211 (2005) (citing Steve P. Calandrillo, Sports Medicine Con-
flicts: Team Physicians vs. Athlete Patients, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J., 190-91 (2005)).  For a
discussion of sports physicians according to the American Medical Association
(“AMA”), see sources cited infra note 87 and accompanying text. R
84. See Scott Polsky, Comment, Winning Medicine: Professional Sports Team Doc-
tors’ Conflict of Interest, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 503, 507 (acknowledging
that definition of team physician is not precise but defining team physician as
“physician who undertakes to render medical services to athletic participants and
whose services are either arranged for or paid for at least in part by the institution
or entity other than the patient, the patient’s family, or some surrogate” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing Joseph H. King Jr., The Duty and Standard of Car
for Team Physicians, 18 HOUS. L. REV. 657, 658 (1981)).  For a discussion of require-
ments of team physicians, qualifications, and responsibilities, see Information
Statement: Team Physician Definition, Qualifications, and Responsibilities: Consensus
Statement AAOS, http://www.aaos.org/about/papers/advistmt/1021.asp (last up-
dated June 2013).
85. See Calandrillo, supra note 78, at 191 (discussing team’s control over em-
ployee physicians).
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tionship with the team may conflict with the physician’s relation-
ship with the athletes, as the physician is not an employee of the
individual athlete, but the team.86  Recognizing this conflicting re-
lationship, the American Medical Association (“AMA”) “requires
that any contractual relationship entered into by physicians with
teams be free from lay interference in medical matters, and that a
doctor’s primary responsibility [is] to [the] patient.”87  Further-
more, physicians are bound by the Hippocratic Oath, which holds
physicians’ treatment of patients to the highest standard of care.88
Under the AMA’s Code of Ethics, team physicians cannot let
financial interests interfere with their level of medical care, which
can be especially difficult given the tension between a team’s salary
payment and the players’ health.89  Additionally, team physicians
are often placed in a difficult position when it comes to administer-
ing medical care to players, with the possibility of either fame or
notoriety, depending on how well the treatment goes.90  Further,
86. See id. at 191 (discussing conflict of interest between physician and ath-
lete). See also Anthony A. Romeo, Team Physicians Must Balance Conflict of Interest,
HEALIO (July 2013), http://www.healio.com/orthopedics/sports-medicine/news/
print/orthopedics-today/%7B6731ea9a-fe9a-4edc-8f62-b2da1c29bab7%7D/team-
physicians-must-balance-conflict-of-interest (noting physicians, in taking Hippo-
cratic oath, swear to make patient priority-without conflict).  When their patients
play professionally, “doctors often will encounter severe pressures from their em-
ployers, the patients, and from their own self-interests to compromise their medi-
cal ethics.” See Polsky, supra note 84, at 503.  Team physicians are often placed in R
tough positions because the physicians do not want to be too conservative in their
treatment if it means that the player will not get better, as the physician could get
fired for underperforming. See id. (discussing team physicians’ concerns). See also
Mitten, supra note 83, at 211 (discussing that team physicians commonly give “dis- R
counted medical care [to the team’s] players”).
87. See Calandrillo, supra note 78, at 191 (discussing employer-employee rela-
tionship between team physician and athlete).  According to the AMA “the inter-
ests of the patient . . . should be paramount in the practice of medicine.” See
Polsky, supra note 84, at 505 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).  AMA’s Code R
of Ethics mandates that physicians put their patient’s interests first and foremost,
and “health care providers are bound not to let any other interest interfere with
that of the patient in being cured.” See Calandrillo, supra note 78, at 188-89 (cita-
tions omitted) (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. See Peter Tyson, The Hippocratic Oath Today, PBS NOVA (Mar. 27, 2001),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/body/hippocratic-oath-today.html (discussing
the history of the Hippocratic Oath and listing old and new versions of oath).
89. See AMA Code of Medical Ethics § 8.03 (1994), available at http://www
.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-
ethics/opinion803.page (prohibiting physicians from placing their own financial
interests above health of their patients).  If a conflict arises between the physician’s
financial interests and the player’s interests, the physician still must put the player
first. See Calandrillo, supra note 78, at 189 (citing AMA Code of Medical Ethics
§ 8.03).
90. See Polsky, supra note 84, at 524-25 (noting difficult positions physicians R
may be put in because of public attention).  In addressing team physicians’ con-
flicts of interests, Polsky states the following:
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the prestige of being a physician for a professional sports team can
cause physician groups to compete with each other.91  In contrast
to a physician’s duty to place players’ health above all, players con-
tinuously feel pressure to outperform the competition– an area in
which both successes and failures affect their fame and economic
status–and also must face influence from peers, pride, and the love
of the game.92  Likewise, athletes feel pressure to play through ill-
ness, injury, and pain, despite the health risks.93
1. Medical Malpractice Suits
Players primarily have sued team physicians for negligence, al-
leging malpractice.94  Players base medical malpractice claims “on a
team physician’s failure to discover an abnormality during a physi-
cal examination, improper medical clearance, improper medical
care, or failure to disclose the nature and extent of an injury.”95
Decisions are usually made on a case-by-case basis, depending on
It is not easy to make clear judgments, however, when an employer is
telling the doctor, an employee, to get the players ready to play as quickly
as possible, the player is telling the doctor to get him back into play as
quickly as possible, and the media and the fans want the player to play as
quickly as possible.
Id. at 505.
91. See Calandrillo, supra note 78, at 188 (discussing how prestige and power
of professional sport’s team physicians can cause competition).
92. See Polsky, supra note 84, at 504 (citations omitted) (discussing athletes’ R
pressures of performing); Michelle Hill, Athletes Performing Under Pressure, SPORTS
BUSINESS, http://www.sportsnetworker.com/2010/06/02/athletes-performing-
under-pressure/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2014) (discussing how athletes’ fear of fail-
ure and pressure can affect athletes psychologically).
93. See Calandrillo, supra note 78, at 189 (discussing how athletes may want to
disregard their health to play).  Playing through pain can pose long–term psychiat-
ric risks, such as emotional distress and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). See
generally Samantha O’ Connell & Theo C. Manschreck, Playing Through the Pain:
Psychiatric Risks Among Athletes, 11 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY, 16, 16 (July 2012), available
at http://www.currentpsychiatry.com/fileadmin/cp_archive/pdf/1107/1107CP_
OConnell.pdf.
94. See Nick DiCello, Note, No Pain, No Gain, No Compensation: Exploiting Profes-
sional Athletes Through Substandard Medical Care Administered by Team Physicians, 49
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 507, 518 (2001) (discussing team physicians and players’ suits
alleging medical malpractice against physicians).  Courts generally give deference
to a physician’s medical opinion. See Mitten, supra note 83, at 212-13  (“[I]t will be R
the rare case regarding participation in athletics where a court may substitute its
judgment for that of the . . . team physicians.” (second alteration in original) (cit-
ing Knapp v. Nw. Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 485 (7th Cir. 1996))).
95. See DiCello, supra note 94, at 518-19 (discussing athletes’ suits against phy- R
sicians). See also Steven M. Kane & Richard A. White, Medical Malpractice and the
Sports Medicine Clinician, NCBI (Nov. 7, 2008), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC2628504/ (discussing history of patients’ suits against sports physi-
cians alleging medical malpractice and duties of team physician).
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whether the doctor’s alleged conduct deviated from the reasonable
standard of care “according to common law tort principles.”96
For sports tort actions, players most commonly claim negli-
gence: that the defendant breached his or her duty of care.97  To
succeed in a negligence claim, the plaintiff must prove that the de-
fendant did something that an “ordinary, prudent person would
not have done under similar circumstances,” or that the defendant
“failed to do something that an ordinary, prudent person would
have done in similar circumstances.”98  In negligence claims, the
plaintiff has the burden to prove that the defendant negligently
“act[ed] or omitted [to act]” and that the act or omission “was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury or a cause which proxi-
mately contributed to it.”99  Furthermore, the plaintiff must show
four elements: an established duty of care, a breach of that estab-
lished duty, a proximate cause or a causal connection between the
act or omission and the plaintiff’s injury, and damages or injury
that resulted from the breach.100
2. Duty of Care of Sports Physicians101
Under tort law, an actor must conduct himself in a manner
aware of the fact that he risks liability should he breach a legal duty
to another person.102  The CBA outlines most medical care owed to
96. See DiCello, supra note 94, at 519 (indicating procedure for determining R
whether physician committed medical malpractice).  For a discussion regarding a
suit by an NFL player against a team physician, see generally Brent Schrotenboer,
Chargers Doctor Found Liable in Medical Malpractice Suit, USA TODAY SPORTS, http://
usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/chargers/story/2012-07-27/doctor-
malpractice-suit/56545172/1 (last updated July 28, 2012).
97. See Walter T. Champion, Jr., FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAW § 4:1 SPORTS
MEDICINE, GENERALLY, Westlaw (2013) (discussing potential claims athletes have
against physicians).
98. See id. (discussing reasonable person standard in negligence suits).
99. See id. (describing plaintiff’s burden of proof).
100. See id. (discussing elements of negligence claim).
101. The American Board of Medical Specialties does not recognize sports
medicine as a specialization; “the American Osteopathic Association does have a
certification board for sports medicine.” See Matthew J. Mitten, Emerging Legal
Issues in Sports Medicine: A Synthesis, Summary, and Analysis, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 5,
10 (2002) [hereinafter Mitten II].  However, sports medicine has grown as a field.
See DiCello, supra note 94, at 513 (“The Professional Team Physicians R
Organization, of whom over eighty percent are professional team physicians,
provides descriptions of injuries and their prevention online.” (citing Kenneth
Shouler, After the Fall, CIGAR AFICIONADO 85 (2001))).
102. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 (2013) (describing legal defini-
tion of duty under tort law).
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professional players.103  The CBAs establish teams’ duty of reasona-
ble care to “ensure the safety, fitness, and health of their
players.”104
3. Standard of Care Once a Duty of Care is Established
Once the duty of care has been established, the plaintiff must
establish the standard by which that duty is fulfilled.105  The appro-
priate standard of care for a physician is not what is commonly
done, but what a reasonable person would have done in similar cir-
cumstances.106  In the context of professional sports, a team doctor
“should perform with the level of knowledge, skill and care that is
expected of a reasonably competent medical practitioner under
similar circumstances, taking into account reasonable limits that
have been placed on the scope of the physician’s undertaking.”107
Typically, the standard of care is connected to a doctor’s specialty;
103. See DiCello, supra note 94, at 517 (discussing contractual nature of collec- R
tive bargaining agreement and its terms to protect players’ health). See generally
NHLPA, supra note 12 (citing NHL collective bargaining agreement).
104. See DiCello, supra note 94, at 517 (discussing importance of collective
bargaining in determining physician’s standard of care). See generally 2012 CBA,
supra note 13. R
105. See Justin P. Caldarone, Professional Team Doctors: Money, Prestige, and Ethi-
cal Dilemmas, 9 SPORTS LAW. J. 131, 138 (2002) (discussing legal standard of a physi-
cian’s duty of care, conflicts of interest, and affirmative defenses available to
physicians).
106. See Mitten II, supra note 101, at 12, 23,, 12 nn.11 & 23  (“explaining that
a physician who renders medical treatment has a duty to do so in a non-negligent
manner consistent with ‘good and accepted standards of medical care’” (citing
Classen v. Izquierdo, 520 N.Y.S. 2d 999, 1002 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987))).
107. See Caldarone, supra note 105, at 138 (internal quotation marks omitted) R
(quoting Joseph H. King Jr., The Duty and Standard of Care for Team Physicians, 18
HOUS. L. REV. 657, 692 (1981)). See also Classen v. Izquierdo, 520 N.Y.S. 2d 999,
1002 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (reasoning that physicians should treat an athlete “in
accordance with good and accepted standards of medical care[ ]”). According to
appellate courts, to set the appropriate standard of care and establish a physician’s
medical malpractice liability, the athlete must use expert testimony. See Gardner v.
Holifield, 639 So. 2d 652, 656-57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (reasoning that expert
testimony regarding physician’s medical malpractice was dispositive in precluding
summary judgment); Toppel v. Redondo 617 N.E.2d 403, 404 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)
(implying that expert testimony can be used and is relevant to prove a physician’s
medical malpractice); Mikkelson v. Haslam, 764 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah Ct. App.
1988) (using plaintiff’s current physician’s comments regarding defendant physi-
cian’s care of plaintiff). But see Rosenweig v. State, 171 N.Y.S.2d 912, 914 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1958) (holding state not liable for examining doctor’s error), aff’d, 158 N.E.2d
229 (N.Y. 1959).  Even federal courts adopt the requirement for expert testimony
to prove medical malpractice liability. See Zimbauer v. Milwaukee Orthopedic
Grp., Ltd., 920 F. Supp. 959, 965-66 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (holding that professional
baseball player’s suit against treating physician is dismissed because of lack of ex-
pert testimony); Gardner, 639 So. 2d at 655, 657 (allowing medical expert affida-
vits to raise factual issues for the jury as to whether physician committed medical
malpractice); Dailey v. Winston, 1986 WL 12063 *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 1986)
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“[f]or example, an orthopedic surgeon should held to the standard
of an orthopedist providing sports medicine care.”108  Team physi-
cians should dispense drugs in accordance with the player’s best
health interests.109  For example, team physicians should exercise
caution to ensure that a prescription drug is treating the underlying
injury, not simply masking or aggravating its pain.110  Furthermore,
according to the Controlled Substances Act, a physician may only
prescribe a controlled substance for a “legitimate medical
purpose.”111
B. Were NHL Physicians Negligent in Boogaard’s Case?
To recover for medical malpractice, a plaintiff must establish
the following elements: (1) the physician owed the player a duty;
(2) the physician breached that duty; (3) damages existed; and (4)
there is legal causation between the physician’s care and the
player’s damages.112  Because of the doctor-patient relationship, the
physician will almost always owe a duty of care to the patient.113
Generally, a patient can establish a duty of care in two ways: (1)
“through a general duty created pursuant to the third-party benefi-
ciary theory[,]” or (2) “under tort theory, where a duty is imposed
(indicating that expert testimony necessitated jury resolution of whether physician
committed medical malpractice).
108. See Mitten II, supra note 101, at 10 (discussing how to compare physi-
cian’s standard of care to what standard of care should be).
109. See id. at 20 (stating that team physician may be found negligent for dis-
pensing any controlled drugs in illegal or careless manner).
110. See id. (citing James J. Thornton, Playing in Pain: When Should an Athlete
Stop?. The Physician & Sports Medicine, Sept. 1990, at 138, 140). See also Branch
IV, supra note 82 (quoting “Dr. Jane Ballantyne, a professor of anesthesiology and
pain medicine at the University of Washington”).  Dr. Ballantyne stated that team
physicians tend to overtreat because they often want to help the team players’ re-
turn to competition. See id. She also stated that “because the famous athletes have
access to virtually any doctor they want, they often receive whatever treatment they
want.” See id.
111. See David H. Sohn, Can I Have a Refill on My Percocet, AAOS (Sept. 2012),
http://www.aaos.org/news/aaosnow/sep12/managing6.asp (discussing safe-
guards for prescribing opioids and what constitutes “legitimate medical purpose”).
112. See Michael Landis, Note, The Team Physician: An Analysis of the Causes of
Action, Conflicts, Defenses and Improvements, 1 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 139, 140 (2003) (noting elements that athlete must prove to have successful
medical malpractice claim against physician).  Under tort law, the word damages
“denote[s] a sum of money awarded to a person injured by the tort of another.”
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §12A (2013). Furthermore, causation “de-
note[s] the fact that the causal sequence by which the actor’s tortious conduct has
resulted in an invasion of some legally protected interest of another is such that
the law holds the actor responsible for such harm unless there is some defense to
liability.” See id. § 9.
113. See Polsky, supra note 84, at 509 (discussing the duty of care physicians R
owe to patients).
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on anyone who begins to perform services for another’s benefit.”114
The duty of care under tort theory does not depend on a contrac-
tual obligation between the player and physician or on compensa-
tion for the physician’s treatment.115
Boogaard has a legitimate negligence claim against the SABH
program’s physicians.116  First, a duty exists because of the doctor-
patient relationship established upon the physicians’ treatment of
Boogaard.117  Second, a court must determine whether Boogaard’s
prescribing physicians performed to the level expected of a reason-
ably competent physician under similar circumstances.118  The
court determines the reasonableness of the physicians’ conduct
through whether Boogaard’s course of treatment was in his best
interest.119
In Boogaard’s case, a strong argument exists that prescribing
Boogaard copious amounts of pills with the information that the
player had an addiction, or that he could develop one, constitutes
negligent physician conduct, and is unreasonable compared to the
standard of care expected of a physician licensed to prescribe
opioids.120  Additionally, no legitimate medical purpose existed for
prescribing opioids to Boogaard.121  Further, the SABH physicians’
114. See Caldarone, supra note 105, at 136-37 (discussing theories of tort R
liability).
115. See id. at 137 (discussing physicians’ duty of care and noting that duty of
care “exists regardless of who pays or even whether the doctor will or expects to be
paid at all” (citing Joseph H. King Jr., The Duty and Standard of Car for Team Physi-
cians, 18 HOUS. L. REV. 657, 665 (1981) ). See generally Complaint, supra note 6
(alleging SABH program’s negligence).
116. See generally Complaint, supra note 6 (discussing Boogaard’s treatment at
SABH program).
117. See id.  For a discussion of physician-patient relationship, see supra notes
82-111 and accompanying text. R
118. For a discussion of the reasonable standard of care requirement, see
supra notes 105-108 and accompanying text. R
119. For a discussion of physician standard of care, see supra notes 82-100 and R
accompanying text.
120. For a discussion of the amounts of prescription pills that physicians pre-
scribed to Boogaard, see Complaint supra note 6, para. 5.  According to the Con-
trolled Substances Act, the number of times a prescription may be refilled ranges
from zero to five refills. See U.S. Department of Justice, Controlled Substances Listed
in Schedules III, IV, and V, http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/21cfr/cfr/1306/
1306_22.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 204). The only way to obtain controlled sub-
stances legally is through a physician’s prescription. See id.
121. See Sohn, supra note 111 (discussing what “legitimate medical purposes” R
legally entails). See also, David B. Brushwood, Defining “Legitimate Medical Purpose”,
62 AM. J. HEALTH-SYST PHARM 306, 306-308 (2005) (discussing Ninth Circuit court’s
decision in Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004) which held that
authority to define “legitimate medical purpose under federal Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) regulations . . . rests with state governments” (internal quo-
tation marks omitted) (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted)).  For a federal stat-
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negligence caused Boogaard’s injuries in two ways: (1) the constant
prescriptions led to his addiction and (2) his participation in the
SABH program did not help to cure his addiction.122  Finally, Boo-
gaard’s addiction and death constitute the damages he incurred
from the physicians opioid prescriptions.123  Therefore, the SABH
physicians negligently breached their duty of care when treating
Boogaard.124
Players have sued the NHL claiming negligence in treating
head-related injuries previously, showing that, unfortunately, Boo-
gaard is not alone.125  In fact, ten former NHL players filed suit
against the NHL “alleging that it concealed evidence of severe
brain damage risks posed by repeated concussions, failed to protect
players from on-ice head trauma, implemented rules that increased
risk, and delayed implementing a concussion management pro-
gram.”126  The lawsuit grew to include at least 200 former play-
ers.127  The players alleged that the NHL assumed a duty to care for
their head injuries when the NHL instituted its concussion program
in 1997.128  The players alleged that the league did not implement a
timely concussion management program after conducting a study,
did not ban fighting or body-checking, and employed enforcers.129
utory reference, see 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04 (“A prescription for a controlled
substance o be effective must be issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an
individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional practice.”)
122. See generally Complaint, supra note 6 (alleging physician’s negligence
caused Boogaard’s addiction).
123. See generally id. (discussing reason for bringing claim).
124. Id. Taking into account the amounts of opioids that SABH program phy-
sicians prescribed to Boogaard, Boogaard’s violations of the SABH program with-
out punishment, and Boogaard’s urine six positive urine tests indicating opioid
abuse before he was placed into the SABH program for the second time. See Com-
plaint supra note 6, at Counts I-II. R
125. See Chris Stevenson, NHL Being Sued by 10 Former Players Over Concussions,
Nov. 25, 2013, http://www.torontosun.com/2013/11/25/nhl-being-sued-by-10-for-
mer-players-over-concussions (discussing NHL players suit).
126. Steven M. Sellers, Ex-players Sue NHL for Improper Concussion Management,
JUSTICE.ORG (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.justice.org/cps/rde/xchg/justice/
hs.xsl/22457.htm (discussing NHL players’ suit).  According to the Complaint,
“from 1997 to 2008, an average of seventy-six players per year suffered a concus-
sion on the ice.  For the 2011-2012 season, 90 players suffered a concussion on the
ice at a loss of 1,779 man games.” See Sean McIndoe Everything You Need to Know
About the NHL Concussion Lawsuit, GRANTLAND (Nov. 27, 2013), http://grantland
.com/features/the-nhl-concussion-lawsuit/ (stating that “the league knew (or
should have known) about the dangers posed by concussion and failed to do
enough to reduce the risk of head injuries and educate players about the issue”).
127. See Sellers, supra note 126 (discussing how NHL players’ suit is growing
in plaintiffs).
128. See id. (mentioning that “the league recorded baseline brain testing for
all players and collected injury data for each season from 1979 to 2004”).
129. See id. (discussing NHL players’ claims against NHL).
27
Romero: Check to the Head: The Tragic Death of NHL Enforcer Derek Boogaar
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
36293-vls_22-1 Sheet No. 157 Side B      04/07/2015   08:38:16
36293-vls_22-1 Sheet No. 157 Side B      04/07/2015   08:38:16
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-1\VLS107.txt unknown Seq: 28 31-MAR-15 13:14
298 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: p. 271
The concussion study discussed the number of reported concus-
sions from 1997 to 2004, but did not discuss the effects of those
concussions on the players’ long-term health.130  Moreover, the
league had access to data regarding players’ concussion susceptibil-
ity, yet, the complaint alleged that the NHL actually took steps that
increased the risk of concussions, like installing rigid glass around
the ice rink.131  These steps, combined with the NHL’s apparent
negligence in addressing concussion incidents, compose the plain-
tiffs’ main argument that the NHL neglected its duty of care.132
However, although Boogaard and the other NHL players have filed
suits, they will likely see limited recovery.133
IV. THE INADEQUACY OF AVAILABLE REMEDIES
NHL players are employees of the NHL under the CBA.134  As
employees, NHL players could be entitled to workers’ compensa-
tion if their injuries occurred within the scope of employment.135  If
the physician’s improper medical treatment of the player caused
the original injury, or aggravated an existing injury, then workers’
compensation laws should cover the player.136  Theoretically, play-
ers can sue teams under both workers’ compensation and tort
130. See id. (discussing NHL players’ claims against NHL for failing to disclose
potential brain injuries).
131. See id. (discussing safety measures NHL could adopt to make game
safer).  These steps included “a change from flexible glass boards to rigid ones,
despite ‘immediate complaints from players that the rigid glass was like hitting a
brick wall.” See id.
132. See id. (summarizing plaintiffs’ claims against NHL).  The plaintiffs’
claim that the NHL failed to acknowledge the “growing body of scientific evidence
and its compelling conclusion that hockey players who sustain repetitive concus-
sive events, sub concussive events and/or brain injuries are at a significantly
greater risk for chronic neurocognitive illness and disabilities both during their
hockey careers and later in life.” See id.
133. For a discussion of remedies available to injured NFL players, see infra
notes 148-181 and accompanying text. R
134. “The NHL recognizes the NHLPA as the exclusive bargaining represen-
tative of all present and future Players employed as such in the League by the
Clubs . . . .” 2012 CBA, supra note 13, art. 2. See also Bryant v. Fox, 515 N.E.2d 775,
779 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (holding professional football players are “employees
rather than independent contractors”).
135. See Mitten, supra note 83, at 213 (discussing treatment of professional
players as employees and implications for players’ medical malpractice claims
against team’s physician).
136. See id. at 213 (citing ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORK-
ERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 22.04[1][b] (2005); BENJAMIN T. BOSCOLO & GERALD
HERZ, PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES AND THE LAW OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION RIGHTS
AND REMEDIES, in 3 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS § 17:3 (Gary A.
Uberstine et al. eds., 2004)). Aggravated injuries are covered because they oc-
curred within the scope of the players’ employment. See id.
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law.137  However, these remedies are inadequate, disincentivize phy-
sicians from providing proper treatment, and usually bar player re-
covery for medical malpractice.138  Furthermore, teams have
complete control over the players’ health, which causes more diffi-
culty for athletes to recover under workers’ compensation laws.139
A. Limited Opportunity for Recovery Under Workers’
Compensation Laws
Workers’ compensation laws allow employees to recover for
any disability or death incurred from injuries or diseases acquired
on the job.140  Even though most occupational employees are pro-
tected under workers’ compensation laws, some jurisdictions do not
adequately protect athletes under workers’ compensation laws even
though they are considered team employees.141  Under federal
workers’ compensation laws, professional sports teams are bound to
workers’ compensation laws.142  States’ workers’ compensation laws
137. For a discussion of workers’ compensation claims and tort law claims, see
infra notes 140-167 and accompanying text. R
138. See Mitten, supra note 83, at 214 (stating “construction of co-employee
doctrine under workers’ compensation laws creates a disincentive to adequately
protect professional athletes’ health and to serve effectively as a gatekeeper”).
139. See Herbert, supra note 64, at 276 (noting that athlete’s working environ-
ments are different than a regular employee which calls for adjustments to work-
ers’ compensation laws).
140. See MARJORIE A. SHIELDS, ANNOTATION, AWARD OF WORKERS’ COMPENSA-
TION BENEFITS TO PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES, 112 A.L.R. 5th 365, (2003) (discussing
workers compensation cases and state laws).  For a discussion of the purposes of
workers’ compensation laws, see id. (citing AM. JUR. 2d, Workers’ Compensation § 5).
Each state has its own workers’ compensation law. See id.
141. See Rachel Schaffer, Note, Grabbing Them By the Balls: Legislatures, Courts,
and Team Owners Bar Non-Elite Professional Athletes from Workers’ Compensation, 8 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 623, 624 (2000) (mentioning some teams usually bar
players from workers’ compensation recovery through contractual restrictions (cit-
ing ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 1, at 1-1 (1997))).
See also, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1999) (defining “employee” broadly, excluding only
a select few).  Florida does not protect athletes under its workers’ compensation
laws. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 440.02 (1)(c)(3) (stating “employment does not include
service performed by or as: professional athletes . . .”).
142. See Tracy Farrell, Determination of “Employee” Status”, in 82 AM. JUR. 2d
Workers’ Compensation § 119 (discussing workers compensation laws and what is con-
sidered an employee).  Other states such as Massachusetts and Wyoming exclude
professional athletes under workers’ compensation laws because they are not con-
sidered employees. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 152 § 1(4) (West 1998); Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(vii)(F) (Michie) (1998).  Some states such as Rhode Is-
land and Washington only exclude certain types of athletes from workers’ compen-
sation coverage. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-29-15 (1998) (exempting professional
hockey players from workers’ compensation coverage); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 51.12.020 (West & Supp. 1998) (excluding horse race jockeys from workers’
compensation coverage).
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may vary slightly, but they typically contain similar provisions.143  Al-
though some workers’ compensation laws do not protect athletes,
certain courts have recognized that workers’ compensation laws do
apply to professional athletes as employees of their respective
teams.144  Specifically, courts have recognized that professional ath-
letes are not exempt from coverage if they incurred an injury within
the scope of their employment.145  Only two states, Pennsylvania
and Florida, specifically address professional athletes in their work-
ers’ compensation statutes.146  However, workers’ compensation
laws and employee opioid addiction seems to be of growing legal
concern.147
143. See SHIELDS, supra note 140 (stating that workers’ compensation acts usu- R
ally include “a right to compensation for all injuries incident to employment with
certain exceptions, abrogation of the common-law doctrines of negligence, substi-
tution of a simple and inexpensive scheme for securing a prompt settlement of
claims, and immunity from suit for the employer although there are some well
recognized exceptions to the rule of exclusivity as a remedy of workers’ compensa-
tion laws, under which remedies at law may be brought by workers for injuries
incurred”).
144. See SHIELDS, supra note 140 (discussing some court’s treatment of ath- R
letes under workers’ compensation laws).
145. See SHIELDS, supra note 140 (stating that scope of players’ employment is R
essentially their performance in games they play in).  For other instances of courts’
decision regarding workers’ compensation laws, see id (stating that “a professional
athlete, who would normally be excluded form coverage under a workers’ compen-
sation statute, may be covered for injuries occurring when the athlete is engaged,
at the employer’s direction, in activities outside the normal scope of athlete’s em-
ployment”). See also Miles v. Montreal Baseball Club, 379 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980) (holding professional baseball player was covered under workers’ com-
pensation laws because injury incurred from diving accident at press party that
player was required to attend constituted injury outside of his scope of employ-
ment).  For more instances of statutory treatment of professional athletes under
workers’ compensation laws, see Stephen Cormac Carlin & Christopher M. Fair-
man, Squeeze Play: Workers’ Compensation and the Professional Athlete, 2 U. MIAMI ENT.
& SPORTS L. REV. 95, 104-113 (Fall 1994/Spring 1995) (stating some states do not
have separate workers’ compensation laws for athletes, election method, and states
that set-off workers’ compensation benefits).
146. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.02 Definitions  (West 2013) (stating definition
of professional athletes); 77 PA. STAT. ANN. § 565 (discussing rules for professional
athletes to be compensated).
147. See WC Issues & Trends, 20 NO. 9 QUINLAN, WORKERS’ COMP BOTTOM LINE
art. 9 (2011) (stating growing problem of opioid addiction among injured work-
ers).  According to a study of prescription drug practices in 17 large states, the
Workers’ Compensation Research Institute (WCRI) “concluded that many doctors
are not following the guidelines when prescribing narcotic painkillers to injured
workers[,]” which opens the door for employees to abuse opioids. See id. See also
Michael Levin-Epstein, Opioid Use for Chronic Pain Concerns WC Stakeholders, 19 NO. 2
QUINLAN, WORKERS’ COMP BOTTOM LINE art. 4 (2010) (stating new study done by
National Council on Compensation reports “prescription drug costs count for
nearly one-quarter of all workers’ compensation”); id. (stating rising costs in
opioid prescriptions can have implications for workers’ benefits under workers’
compensation laws).  This issue will not be discussed in this Comment because
30
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To recover under workers’ compensation laws, plaintiffs must
prove three elements: (1) an employer-employee relationship, (2) a
causal relationship between the injury and job, and (3) that the
specific state’s statute covers that type of employment.148  The
player employer-employee relationship, broadly construed, must
have existed at the time of the injury.149  A causal relationship exists
between the injury and occupation if the injury arose out of and in
the course of employment.150  More specifically, the personal injury
causally relates to employment “if it is caused by a risk that is
closely, directly, or distinctly associated with the employment” in
the course of employment.151  Personal injuries are usually classi-
fied as “accidental” when caused by a specific event.152
B. Physicians Have Tort Immunity Under CBA
Players would normally allege treating physician negligence
under tort law.153  However, players are barred from tort recov-
ery.154  Under a team’s CBA, physicians are employees of the teams,
and as a co-employee of the players, team physicians are immune
from tort liability.155  Teams purposefully designate physicians as
athletes are generally not considered “employees” under workers’ compensation
laws. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.02.
148. Bobbi N. Roquemore, Note, Creating a Level Playing Field: The Case for
Bringing Workers’ Compensation for Professional Athletes Into a Single Federal System by
Extending the Longshore Act, 57 LOY. L. REV. 793, 804 (2011) (citations omitted)
(discussing that state’s workers’ compensation laws inadequately protect athletes).
149. See id. (stating “an employee is defined as one who works for an is under
the control of another for hire” (citing JAMES T. GRAY & MARTIN J. GREENBERG,
SPORTS LAW PRACTICE § 12.05 (2010))).
150. See id. at 804-05 (discussing the second requirement for workers’ com-
pensation claim to be valid) (citation omitted).
151. Id. at 805 (discussing how injuries may qualify for workers’ compensation
coverage) (citing PETER M. LENCSIS, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: A REFERENCE AND
GUIDE 62, at 36 (Quorum Books 1998)); GRAY & GREENBERG, SPORTS LAW PRACTICE
§ 12.05; MARGARET C. JASPER, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW 32 at 23 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2008)).
152. See Roquemore, supra note 148, at 805 (discussing nature of personal
injuries under workers’ compensation laws).
153. For a discussion of potential negligence lawsuits against physicians, see
supra notes 102-111 and accompanying text. R
154. See Michelle L. Modery, Injury Time-Out: Justifying Workers’ Compensation
Awards to Retired Athletes with Concussion-Caused Dementia, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 247, 250
(2011) (stating employees must waive tort causes of action for injuries covered
under workers’ compensation laws (citing 2 MODERN WORKERS COMPENSATION
§ 102:1 (2011))). See, e.g., Mendes v. Tin Kee Ng, 507 N.E.2d 1048, 1051 (Mass.
1987) (recognizing that employee cannot resort to tort cause of action if claim is
covered by workers’ compensation).
155. See Mitten, supra note 83, at 213, 217 (citing Daniels v. Seahawks, 968
P.2d 883, 885 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (discussing physician and player co-employee
status, which exempts physicians from tort liability). See also 2005 CBA and 2012
31
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employees to ensure that their physicians are immune from tort
liability if the player received improper medical care administered
within the physician’s scope of employment.156  Physicians’ scope of
immunity from players’ tort claims, which typically include medical
malpractice alleging negligence,157 extends within their scope of
employment,158 and, therefore, immunizing team physicians from
players’ tort claims gives players the “short end of the stick”.159
In what appears to be an intentional effort to limit physician
tort liability, the NHL CBA specifically notes that physicians are em-
ployees of the NHL; they are not independent contractors.160  If
physicians acted as independent contractors, players could bring
tort suits against them, which would properly balance the protec-
tion of both the physicians and the players.161  However, if players
could bring tort suits against physicians, physicians would be pro-
tected from strict liability and automatic medical malpractice be-
CBA; 101 C.J.S. Workers’ Compensation § 1850 (2014) (noting that if a physician and
patient are employees of the same employer, “the patient may be barred by the co-
employee immunity conferred by the applicable workers’ compensation act from
maintaining a medical malpractice action against the physician” (citation
omitted)).
156. See Mitten, supra note 83, at 214 n.19 (stating physician immunity from
players’ tort claims “vary by jurisdiction, generally provides that workers’ compen-
sation benefits are the exclusive remedy available to an injured employee and pro-
hibits a tort suit against a co-employee who caused the injury (except for
intentional wrongs)” (citing Bryant v. Fox, 515 N.E.2d 775, 778 (Ill. App. Ct.
1987)); ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW
§ 112.02[1][b], at 112-7 to 112-10.1 (2005)).
157. See Mitten supra note 83, at 213-14. See generally LARSON & LARSON, supra
note 156, § 112.02[1] [b], 112-7-112-10.1. See also Daniels v. Seattle Seahawks, 968
P.2d 883 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (holding NFL player was excluded from bringing
medical malpractice claim against team’s physician that treated player).  The physi-
cian was considered a part-time employee, but also held his own orthopedic private
practice. Id. at 885.  The court’s holding ultimately rested on finding that the phy-
sician and player were under the “same employ” (i.e. under the employment of the
Seattle Seahawks). Id. at 887-88.
158. See Mitten supra note 83, at 213-14 (discussing extent of physicians tort
immunity) (footnote omitted).
159. See Stringer v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club, LLC, 686 N.W.2d 545
(Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (recognizing that even though players and team physicians
are co-employees, physicians should not be immune from tort suits brought by
players), aff’d on other grounds 705 N.W.2d 746, 764 (Minn. 2005) (Hanson, J., dis-
senting) (reasoning that “the injured employee is entitled to be fully compensated
for his injuries by all but the employer; the co-employee tortfeasor should not be
relieved of the consequences of his wrongdoing; extending immunity to the co-
employee would encourage fellow employees to neglect their duties”).
160. See 2005 CBA and 2012 CBA, supra notes 13, 134 (discussing NHL players R
as employees of NHL).
161. See Mitten, supra note 83, at 219 (stating that “[r]emoving the unwar-
ranted protection conferred by co-employee tort immunity would enable a profes-
sional athlete to seek full recovery for harm caused by the team physician’s
negligent care and treatment of his injuries”). See also Stringer, 686 N.W.2d 545.
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cause the player would have the burden to prove liability.162  For a
player to establish liability, the player would need to prove the phy-
sician deviated from reasonable, customary, or accepted sports
medicine care, and that the deviation proximately caused the in-
jury.163  However, to avoid potential double recovery for the same
claim, players must elect to recover either under a workers’ com-
pensation claim or tort law.164
Courts seem to treat professional athletes differently from
other employees under workers’ compensation laws, which exacer-
bates the difficulty of player recovery.165  As one court noted,
“[P]rofessional athletes willfully hold themselves out to risk of fre-
quent, repetitive and serious injury in exchange for lucrative com-
pensation.”166  Even though professional athletes enjoy greater
economic status than an average employee, players should not have
to bear the economic burden of their injuries or injuries that be-
came aggravated because of physicians’ medical malpractice.167
V. BOOGAARD’S CASE AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED
IN THE NHL
A. Workers’ Compensation Claims
The NHL addresses workers’ compensation in its CBA.168
However, difficult questions about recovery arise if the state in
162. See Mitten, supra note 83, at 219 (proposing method for players to bring
tort suits against team physicians).
163. Id. (discussing what players need to prove in tort claim).
164. See id. at 220-21 (explaining that players must choose between workers
compensation benefits or pursuing tort claim against team in connection with
medical malpractice by team physician).
165. See id. at 216 (stating that “[c]ourts recognize it is not necessarily unrea-
sonable for workers’ compensation laws to be applied different to professional ath-
letes than other employees,” and disallowing professional athletes to recover under
workers’ compensation laws “does not deny them equal protection of the law”).
See also Rudolph v. Miami Dolphins, Ltd., 447 So. 2d 284, 291-92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (discussing the reasons for Legislature’s exclusion of players from workers’
compensation benefits); Lyons v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 803 A.2d 857, 861-
62 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) (holding 77 Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit. § 565 did not violate
equal protection by limiting professional athletes to receive a partial amount of
disability benefits).
166. See Mitten, supra note 83, at 216 (quoting Lyons, 803 A.2d. at 862).
167. See id. at 216-17 (discussing consequences of barring athletes from bring-
ing tort claims against treating physicians).
168. See 2005 CBA, supra note 13, art. 31.5, at 129 (stating workers’ compensa-
tion policies under 2005 CBA); 2012 CBA, supra note 13, art. 31.5, at 172 (stating
workers compensation policies under 2012 CBA).  If claims arise in a state where
athletes’ workers’ compensation claims are not required under state law, club “will
either voluntarily obtain coverage under the compensation laws of that state or
otherwise guarantee equivalent benefits to its players.” See 2005 CBA, supra note 13,
33
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which a NHL club is domiciled does not recognize workers’ com-
pensation laws for athletes.169  Athletes should recover workers’
compensation benefits when they are injured as a result of playing
the game they are employed to play.170  Further, co-employee status
should not automatically bar to recovery under workers’ compensa-
tion laws.171  Finally, the automatic barring of claims against SABH
program physicians under a workers’ compensation law because
they are considered NHL employees serves an injustice to NHL
players.172
Boogaard satisfies the first two requirements for a successful
workers’ compensation claim.173  First, the NHL players and the
NHL have an employee-employer relationship, and second, Boo-
gaard’s injuries are causally related to their employment as an NHL
enforcer, because of his purpose of the ice.174  The third require-
ment, state coverage, creates a problem because most states do not
art. 31.5(a), at 129; 2012 CBA, supra note 13, art. 31.5(a), at 172.  If a club “has not
legally elected to be covered by workers’ compensation laws of their state, or any
state, a Player may be entitled under this Article will be determined under the
Grievance procedure in Article 17 of this Agreement.” 2005 CBA, supra note 13,
art. 31.5(b), at 129; 2012 CBA, supra note 13, art. 31.5(b), at 172.
169. See Levin-Epstein, supra note 147 (discussing two states that do not recog-
nize professional athletes as employees).
170. See generally SHIELDS, supra note 140 (discussing how athletes are treated
under workers’ compensation laws). See also Estate of Gross v. Three Rivers Inn.,
Inc., 706 N.E.2d 741, 741 (N.Y. 1998) (holding that professional boxers should not
be barred to recover from New York’s workers’ compensation law); Pro-Football,
Inc. v. Uhlenhake, 574 S.E.2d 288, 289 (Va. 2003) (holding that professional foot-
ball players should not be barred from seeking recovery under Virginia’s Worker
Compensation Act because players incurred injuries from playing game they were
employed to play).
171. See Mitten, supra note 83, at 219-21 (contending that players should be
able to file tort claims against their treating physicians). But see Brocali v. Detroit
Tigers, Inc. 268 S.W. 3d 90, 104-06 (Tex. App. 2008) (ruling that professional base-
ball players’ exclusive remedy against Michigan baseball club was through the
Michigan Workers’ Disability Compensation Act).
172. See Landis, supra note 112, at 156-57 (suggesting that readjustment and
uniformity of workers’ compensation statutes to allow players to bring suits against
team physicians could improve medical treatment and care for professional
athletes).
173. See infra note 174 and accompanying text (contending that Boogaard’s
case satisfies first two elements of workers’ compensation claim).
174. See 2012 CBA, supra note 13, art. 31.5, at 172 (stating workers’ compensa-
tion policy under NHL CBA). See also sources cited, supra notes 29-32 and accom-
panying text (discussing enforcer injuries); Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v.
Huhn, 142 S.E. 121, 125-26 (Ga. 1928) (holding that baseball player was “em-
ployee” under Georgia’s Workmen’s Compensation Act). But see Farren v. Balti-
more Ravens, Inc., 720 N.E.2d 590, 593 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
question of whether professional football player was “employee” at time of injury
under Ohio Workers’ Compensation Act was genuine issue of material fact that
could not be decided at summary judgment).
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include professional athletes in their workers’ compensation
laws.175
B. Tort Claims
Boogaard has a strong tort claim against the SABH program’s
physicians.176  Physicians have commented on both the danger of
high dosages of the pain pills that SABH program physicians pre-
scribed to Boogaard and the overall negligent care of Boogaard.177
Given that these opining physicians serve to establish the standard
of care for the SABH physicians who treated Boogaard, the NHL
doctors likely breached their duty.178  According to the physicians’
standard of care, the SABH program physicians knew or should
have known that Boogaard had addictive tendencies.179  Further,
the SABH program has penalties for players who do not comply
with the treatment program, but declined to enforce such penalties
175. For a further discussion of states with laws covering athletes in workers’
compensation claims, see supra note 146 and accompanying text.  For a discussion
on how courts have applied workers’ compensation laws to professional athletes,
see supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
176. For an outline on a negligence cause of action as applied to Boogaard’s
case, see supra notes 112-124 and accompanying text.
177. See Branch IV, supra note 82 (noting that while several outside drug and
addiction experts declined to comment on Boogaard’s case, “they took note of the
persistently high dosages of medications Boogaard was prescribed, and the seem-
ing lack of a primary doctor overseeing his care[ ]”).  Further, “Dr. Louis Baxter
Sr., the executive medical director of the Professional Assistance Program of New
Jersey and immediate past president of the American Society of Addiction
Medicine . . . . cited a three-step process for addicts: detoxification, rehabilitation
and continuing care[;]” but Dr. Baxter observed that “[c]ontinuing care is proba-
bly the most important part [of the three-step process] . . . [a]nd it looks like
[Boogaard] didn’t have much of that.” See Id.
178. See Landis supra note 112, at 140 (describing elements required to bring
medical malpractice claim).
179. See generally Complaint, supra note 6 (averring Boogaard’s physicians
breached standard of care); Branch IV, supra note 82 (reporting that “[t]he Rang-
ers knew about Boogaard’s addiction problems,” yet “he increasingly received pre-
scriptions for drugs [they] knew he had previously abused”).  Dr. Jane Ballantyne,
a pain expert and Professor at the University of Washington, described that “[t]he
problem with athletes is that they do get multiple injuries and therefore are given
multiple courses of opiates.” See id. Moreover, Ballantyne explained, “when inju-
ries are frequent, it can easily turn into chronic treatment . . . and athletes are at
high risk of developing addiction because of their risk-taking personalities.” See id.
35
Romero: Check to the Head: The Tragic Death of NHL Enforcer Derek Boogaar
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
36293-vls_22-1 Sheet No. 161 Side B      04/07/2015   08:38:16
36293-vls_22-1 Sheet No. 161 Side B      04/07/2015   08:38:16
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-1\VLS107.txt unknown Seq: 36 31-MAR-15 13:14
306 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: p. 271
in Boogaard’s case.180  It was only after Boogaard’s sixth positive
test for opioids that the NHL sent him to the SABH program.181
Certainly, the NHL could raise a defense of contributory negli-
gence by alleging Boogaard’s partial responsibility for his death be-
cause he did not comply with the SABH program, and is ultimately
responsible for his own health and sobriety.182  However, holding
an opioid addict accountable to curb his addiction on his own ac-
cord, especially when he was continuously prescribed opioids for
extensive pain, is unrealistic and unfair.183  Such an allegation may
also serve to shift the responsibility back to Boogaard’s physicians to
have stopped his addiction in the first place, especially when their
care exacerbated his condition.184
A professional hockey player, who was employed as an enforcer
and given prescription pills for his injuries when the NHL knew or
should have known that he had addictive tendencies, should not be
partially accountable under contributory negligence.185  Nor
180. See Complaint, supra note 6, paras. 104-07, 111 (alleging facts regarding
SABH program). According to the complaint, the SABH program was created in
September 1996, “separate and apart from any CBA in place at the time or subse-
quently entered into.” Id. para. 104. Second, “the SABH program was granted
exclusive, unsupervised control of player substance abuse issues by the NHL.” See
id. para. 105. Third, the complaint alleges that the SABH program “was created to
establish a league-wide program to address substance abuse, HIV, and related
health matters for NHL players.” See id. para. 106. Fourth, Doctors David Lewis
and Brian Shaw were paid by the NHL to “serve as Program Doctors for the SABH
program.” See id. para. 107.
181. See Complaint, supra note 6, paras. 122-28 (alleging that NHL did not
enforce penalties for Boogaard’s violations of substance abuse policies); 2005 CBA,
supra note 13, art. 47.7, at 134 (stating  penalties for testing positive for banned
substances); 2012 CBA, supra note 13, art. 47.7, at 191-92 (same).  Under the 2005
CBA, the first positive test for banned substances mandates suspension of the
player. See 2005 CBA, supra note 13, art. 47.7, at 134.
182. See Branch IV, supra note 82 (stating that Boogaard’s father requested
and received medical documents from Wild and Rangers, but “it seems certain that
the records received were not complete . . . . many were missing pages.”); Munson,
supra note 49 (noting that NHL could respond to Boogaard’s suit by blaming Boo-
gaard for his own addiction, but Boogaard’s attorneys “have some powerful ammu-
nition” because “[t]hey will show that team physicians and dentists failed to
maintain proper records of drugs they were prescribing”).
183. For a discussion of Boogaard’s degenerative brain disease and its impact
on his ability to function and make sound decisions, see supra notes 54-60 and
accompanying text.
184. For a discussion of Boogaard’s opioid addiction, see supra notes 36-49
and accompanying text.
185. See Mitten II, supra note 101, at 31-33 (discussing athlete’s contributory
negligence in connection with medical malpractice claims against team physician).
See also Branch IV, supra note 82 (discussing Dr. Louis Baxter’s opinion).  Accord-
ing to Dr. Baxter, “to see [Boogaard] have all that access to those doctors and all
those prescriptions, that is mind boggling . . . He had such easy access to prescrip-
tion medicines.” See id.  Additionally, Gregory J. Davis, a professor of pathology
36
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should an athlete be held responsible for contributory negligence
when the physician renders negligent medical care.186  In contrast,
an athlete should be held accountable for contributory negligence
only when the athlete “voluntarily expos[es] one’s self to an unrea-
sonable risk of harm.”187  While Boogaard may have intentionally
exposed himself to injury by being an NHL player and enforcer, he
did not intentionally expose himself to negligent medical care.188
C. Amending the CBA
Because courts have broadly interpreted CBAs and their con-
tractual nature, claims that would normally fall under tort law are
deemed to be subject to arbitration.189  As such, courts often give
deference to the CBA provisions, which exempts potential players’
tort claims against team physicians.190  Courts adopting this per-
spective reason that because players have willingly agreed to the
CBA as members of a union, they should be subject to the CBA
provisions.191  By amending the CBA to include physicians as inde-
pendent contractors, players could bring tort claims against physi-
cians under state tort law, which would expose teams to potential
vicarious liability for the physician’s malpractice.192
and lab medicine at the University of Kentucky, saw no “smoking guns” in the list
of prescriptions, but did note that “what does leap off the page is that this is a guy
who is in desperate need of some help.” See id.
186. See Mitten II, supra note 101, at 31-33 (discussing athlete’s contributory
negligence); see also id. at 22 (describing a court’s holding that a ringside physician
was negligent where the physician refused “to stop a boxing match in which a
participant received several blows to the head from which he ultimately died” (cit-
ing Classen v. Izquierdo, 520 N.Y.S.2d 999 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987))).
187. See id. at 31 (stating that an athlete’s contributory negligence “involves
exposing one’s self to an unreasonable risk of harm”); id. at 31-32 (stating that
“[a]n athlete has no general duty to diagnose his own condition or to divulge
information . . . . [while] the team physician has a duty to obtain a complete and
accurate medical history from an athlete”); id. at 32 (“An athlete generally may rely
upon the recommendations of the team physician or his designated consulting
specialists without seeking a second medical opinion.”).
188. See generally, Complaint, supra note 6 (discussing Boogaard’s negligence
claims).
189. See Herbert, supra note 64, at 255 (noting that excluding torts form arbi-
tration could be possible remedy).
190. See id. (arguing that amending CBA would allow players to address tort
grievances against team physicians).
191. See id. (noting most players probably are not aware that their tort claims
against physicians can be exempted).
192. See id. at 256-57 (noting allowing teams to be vicariously liable for em-
ployees actions would provide incentive for health care providers to optimally treat
players); Robitaille v. Vancouver Hockey Club, Ltd., 124 D.L.R. (3d) 228, 228 (B.C.
Ct. App. 1981) (holding team was vicariously liable for player’s injuries because
employment contract was entered into by player’s company, and not player).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Although the NHL CBA affords players some health protec-
tions, the league has limited and insufficient health protections for
players considering the aggressive nature of professional hockey.193
Injuries sustained, especially as enforcers, could form the basis of a
massive lawsuit against the NHL similar to the recently resolved Na-
tional Football League (“NFL”) Concussion lawsuit.194  In fact, the
NFL Concussion lawsuit has caused the NHL to begin to confront
such challenges as well.195
Unfortunately, NHL physicians escape responsibility for the
negligent medical treatment and care of NHL enforcers under
workers’ compensation laws.196  Additionally, physicians enjoy tort
immunity, although physician medical malpractice is a legitimate
tort cause of action.197  Furthermore, claims that arise under CBAs
are federally preempted under LMRA.198  Thus, NHL enforcers are
unable to satisfactorily recover.199
193. See John Redlingshafer, Note, Tonight’s Matchup-Workers’ Compensation v.
Medical Malpractice: What Should Lower-Paid, Inexperienced Athletes Receive When a Team
Doctor Allegedly Aids in Ending Their Careers, 2 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 100, 108 (2004) (listing health benefits given to NHL players under CBA).
194. See Bill Barnwell, What You Need to Know About the NFL’s $765 Million Con-
cussion Settlement, GRANTLAND (Aug. 29, 2013), http://grantland.com/the-triangle/
what-you-need-to-know-about-the-nfls-765-million-concussion-settlement/ (discuss-
ing generally NFL players’ lawsuit against NFL for injuries sustained); Steve Silver,
Could the Derek Boogaard Wrongful Death Lawsuit Deliver Knockout Blow to NHL?, YA-
HOO! SPORTS: THE POST GAME (Sept. 17, 2013, 1:22 AM), http://www.thepostgame
.com/blog/daily-take/201309/nhl-concussion-lawsuit-derek-boogaard-nfl (discuss-
ing whether Boogaard’s case can have farther implications for suits against NHL).
But see David Campbell NFL, NHL Concussion Cases are not the Same, YAHOO! NEWS
(Nov. 26, 2013, 7:34 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/nfl-nhl-concussion-cases-not-
same-003425068—spt.html (comparing NFL suit to NHL suit, and discussing how
NFL players’ allegations of NFL misconduct are more serious and outnumber
claims NHL players have against NHL).
195. See Ken Belson and Jeff Z. Klein, N.F.L. Concussion Case Offers Clues for
Hockey Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2013, at B16, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2013/11/27/sports/hockey/nfl-concussion-case-offers-clues-for-hockey-law-
suit.html?_r=0 (discussing attorneys representing NHL players in lawsuit could
take cues from NFL attorneys involved in concussion lawsuit).  For a discussion on
NHL players’ suits against the NHL, see supra notes 125-133 and accompanying
text.
196. For a discussion of why athletes are exempt under workers’ compensa-
tion laws and tort, see supra notes 140-167 and accompanying text.
197. For a discussion of how physicians are immune from players’ tort suits,
see supra notes 153-158 and accompanying text.
198. For a discussion of federal preemption of claims arising under collective
bargaining agreements, see supra note 78 and accompanying text.
199. For a discussion of remedies available to athletes under workers’ com-
pensation and tort, see supra notes 140-188 and accompanying text.
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NHL enforcers, who are injured in the course of employment
and receive negligent medical care, should recover sufficiently
under workers’ compensation laws.200  Tort immunity for team phy-
sicians under the NHL CBA creates a disincentive to administer the
highest level of care since players cannot sue for negligence.201  En-
forcers, whose sole purpose is to bring brute force and physicality to
their team, should be given protection for the very reason they are
employed.202  The presence of employer responsibility, physician
medical care, and a duty of care owed to players becomes virtually
non-existent when players cannot protect themselves against em-
ployer misconduct.203
Melanie Romero*
200. For a discussion of how workers’ compensation laws should provide en-
forcers injury coverage, see supra notes 168-175 and accompanying text.
201. For a discussion of how players should be able to have tort claims against
physicians, see supra notes 176-188 and accompanying text.
202. For a discussion of enforcers, see supra notes 29-32 and accompanying
text.
203. For a discussion of why players are not able to protect their own health
from physicians’ medical malpractice, see supra notes 148-181 and accompanying
text.
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, Villanova University School of Law; B.A., Villanova
University, 2012.  I am grateful to the MSLJ staff writers and editorial board for
their invaluable comments and edits.  I would like to thank my family, especially
my mother and brother, and friends for their support and encouragement.  I want
to dedicate this Comment to my father—my constant source of perseverance.
39
Romero: Check to the Head: The Tragic Death of NHL Enforcer Derek Boogaar
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
